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This paper proposes an integrated approach to indeterminacy and epistemic uncertainty
in order to model an intelligent agent’s decision making about the assertability of
vague statements. Initially, valuation pairs are introduced as a model of truth-gaps for
propositional logic sentences. These take the form of lower and upper truth-valuations
representing absolutely true and not absolutely false respectively. In particular, we consider
valuation pairs based on supervaluationist principles and also on Kleene’s three-valued
logic. The relationship between Kleene valuation pairs and supervaluation pairs is then
explored in some detail with particular reference to a natural ordering on semantic
precision. In the second part of the paper we extend this approach by proposing bipolar
belief pairs as an integrated model combining epistemic uncertainty and indeterminacy.
These comprise of lower and upper belief measures on propositional sentences, deﬁned by
a probability distribution on a ﬁnite set of possible valuation pairs. The properties of these
measures are investigated together with their relationship to different types of uncertainty
measure. Finally, we apply bipolar belief measures in a preliminary decision theoretic study
so as to begin to understand how the use of vague expressions can help to mitigate the
risk associated with making forecasts or promises. This then has potential applications to
natural language generation systems.
© 2012 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
A deﬁning feature of vague concepts is that they admit borderline cases which neither deﬁnitely satisfy the concept
nor its negation. For example, there are some height values which would neither be deﬁnitely classiﬁed as being short nor
not short. For propositions involving vague concepts this naturally results in truth-gaps. In other words, there are cases in
which a proposition is neither absolutely true nor absolutely false. If Ethel’s height lies in a certain intermediate range then the
proposition ‘Ethel is short’ may be inherently borderline. Such truth-gaps suggest that a non-Tarskian notion of truth may be
required to capture this aspect of vagueness even in a simple propositional framework. There has been a number of different
possibilities proposed in the literature for this alternative model of truth including three-valued logics and supervaluations.
In the sequel we will discuss and relate two different models of truth-gaps, supervaluationism and Kleene’s strong three-
valued logic, in the context of a new framework for bipolar valuations. In particular, we will investigate propositional
truth-models taking the form of a lower and an upper truth valuation on the sentences of the language. The underlying
idea is that, given such a valuation pair, the lower truth valuation represents the strong criterion of being absolutely true,
while the upper valuation represents the weaker criterion of being not absolutely false. In this context, borderline statements
are those for which there is a difference between the lower and upper valuations (i.e. a truth-gap).
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deﬁnitions are to a large extent determined by linguistic convention, and according to such conventions a statement may or
may not be assertable given a particular state of the world. Interestingly, a case can be made that assertability is inherently
bipolar, a phenomenon which manifests itself in a distinction between those propositions which convention would deem
deﬁnitely assertable, and those which convention would not classify as incorrect, or perhaps even dishonest, to assert. Parikh
[27] observes that:
Certain sentences are assertible in the sense that we might ourselves assert them and other cases of sentences which
are non-assertible in the sense that we ourselves (and many others) would reproach someone who used them. But there
will also be the intermediate kind of sentences, where we might allow their use.
For example, consider a witness in a court of law describing a suspect as being short. Depending on the actual height
of the suspect this statement may be deemed as clearly true or clearly false, in which latter case the witness could be
accused of perjury. However, there will also be an intermediate height range for which, while there may be doubt and
differing opinions concerning the use of the description short, it would not be deemed as deﬁnitely inappropriate and hence
the witness would not be viewed as committing perjury. In other words, for certain height values of the suspect, it may
be acceptable to assert the statement ‘the suspect was short’, even though this statement would not be viewed as being
absolutely true. Clearly there is a natural connection between this bipolar aspect of assertability and the idea of truth-gaps
for borderline cases outlined above. If a statement θ is absolutely true, a judgment which is of course dependent both on
the state of the world and on how linguistic convention deﬁnes the relevant concepts, then θ would be deﬁnitely assertable.
On the other hand, provided that θ is not absolutely false then θ would be deemed acceptable to assert. The bipolarity
of assertability would seem to be a special case of what Dubois and Prade [7] refer to as symmetric bivariate unipolarity,
whereby judgments are made according to two distinct evaluations on unipolar scales, i.e. distinct evaluations about the
assertability of a sentence and its negation. In the current context, we have a strong and a weak evaluation criterion where
the former corresponds to deﬁnite assertability and the latter to acceptable assertability. As with many examples of this
type of bipolarity there is a natural duality between the two evaluation criteria in that a proposition is deﬁnitely assertable
if and only if it is not acceptable to assert its negation.
The adequate representation of epistemic uncertainty is of central importance in any effective model of belief. Typically
we think of uncertainty as arising because of insuﬃcient information about the state of the world. However, in the presence
of vagueness there may also be semantic uncertainty due to our having only partial knowledge of language conventions.
For example, consider the proposition ‘Ethel is short’. Here an agent with certain knowledge of Ethel’s height may still
be uncertain as to the truth of this proposition due to uncertainty about the conventions governing the deﬁnition of the
concept short. Such uncertainty may naturally arise from the distributed manner in which language is learnt across a
population of communicating agents. Semantic uncertainty often occurs in conjunction with a lack of knowledge concerning
the underlying state of the world. In our example, the agent may also be uncertain as to the precise value of Ethel’s height.
In the sequel then we propose an integrated model of semantic and stochastic uncertainty in the context of language
conventions which admit borderline cases. Here we view truth as a function of both the state of the world, e.g. Ethel’s
height, and language convention, e.g. the interpretation of the concept short in terms of height values. An integrated model
of epistemic uncertainty and truth-gaps can then take the form of a probability distribution on the cross product of the set
of possible world states and the set of possible language conventions. Furthermore, if a convention maps each state of the
world to a valuation pair, then this naturally results in a probability distribution on possible valuation pairs. Given such a
distribution we can immediately deﬁne lower and upper measures by evaluating the probabilities of those valuation pairs
in which a given sentence is absolutely true and of those in which it is not absolutely false respectively. We refer to these
lower and upper measures on the sentences of the language as a bipolar belief pair.
We argue that valuation pairs are one of the most straight-forward representations of truth-gaps in natural language
propositions. Hence, by taking a probability distribution over a set of possible valuation pairs for the language we generate
a very natural integrated model of belief for propositions and sentences which involve vague concepts and about which
there is inherent uncertainty. As such, the proposed framework provides an ideal platform from which we can begin to
explore issues concerning the utility of vagueness in communication. Certainly there are many potential applications of
such a study including in natural language generation [39], consensus modelling [24] and multi-agent dialogues [22]. In this
paper we shall focus mainly on the ﬁrst of these application areas.
A fundamental open problem in natural language generation is that of understanding why individuals often choose
to make vague assertions rather than semantically similar crisp (non-vague) ones. In particular, what are the practical
advantages of such a decision from the perspective of an asserting agent? One approach is to apply decision theory so that
utility values are associated with different expressions quantifying the beneﬁt or gain resulting from their assertion given
a particular state of the world and in the context of particular language conventions. Given such a formalism the problem
is then that of understanding why, in certain situations, a vague assertion may result in a higher expected utility than for
a similar crisp assertion. One type of situation where vague assertions may be preferable in this way, is referred to by
van Deemter [39] as future contingencies. Here we assume that agents are playing what may, to some extent, be seen as
a non-cooperative language game in which different agents have different, and possibly conﬂicting, goals and objectives.
Within communication environments of this kind there may be a risk associated with making forecasts or promises which
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Truth-tables from Kleene’s strong three-valued logic.
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turn out to be wrong or which cannot be kept. This would then be reﬂected in the utility values for different assertions
within a particular context. Mitigating this risk is certainly of practical importance is AI systems such as for automatic
weather forecasting or medical diagnosis. In [39] it is suggested that for predictions or promises vague assertions may
be lower risk than crisp ones. In this paper we shall apply the bipolar belief framework outlined above to carry out a
very preliminary study of future contingencies, from a decision theoretic perspective. The aim will be to demonstrate the
potential of our approach for modelling assertion behaviour, as well as providing some small insight into how truth-gaps
may be exploited so as to minimise risk and maximise gain in complex multi-agent dialogues.
An outline of the paper is as follows: In following section we describe several approaches to modelling truth-gaps
and emphasise how these differ from theories of epistemic uncertainty. Section 3 then introduces valuation pairs and
provides axiomatic characterisations both of supervaluation pairs and of Kleene valuation pairs. In this section we also
investigate the relationship between Kleene and supervaluation pairs as well as discussing the functionality and truth-
functionality of different classes of valuation pairs. Section 4 proposes bipolar belief measures as an integrated model
combining epistemic uncertainty and truth-gaps. We discuss the motivation and justiﬁcation for deﬁning lower and upper
belief measures generated from probability distributions on valuation pairs, and investigate the properties of such belief
pairs especially relating to a semantic precision ordering on valuation pairs. This section will also include an exploration
of the relationship between classes of bipolar belief measures and other types of uncertainty measures, such as possibility
measures and interval-valued fuzzy sets. Section 5 outlines a very preliminary decision theoretic analysis of the use of vague
statements in order to mitigate the risk associated with making predictions or promises. Finally, Section 6 gives conclusions
and proposes some future directions of study.
2. Models for truth-gaps
In this section we outline two general approaches to the modelling of truth-gaps in propositional logic. The ﬁrst is that
of three-valued logics in which an additional truth-value is included in the underlying truth-model in order to represent
borderline cases. A fully truth-functional calculus is then deﬁned for the truth-values T= {t,b, f} where t denotes absolutely
true, b denotes borderline and f denotes absolutely false. Different logics are then characterised by different three-valued
truth-tables for the different connectives. Well known examples of three-valued logics include Lukasiewicz logic [26] and
Kleene’s weak and strong logics [16]. For example, Table 1 shows the truth-tables for the connectives ¬ (negation), ∧
(conjunction) and ∨ (disjunction) for Kleene’s strong logic.
By referring to the middle truth-value as borderline we have consciously adopted somewhat non-standard terminology.
Both Lukasiewicz and Kleene use terminology suggestive of an epistemic interpretation of b corresponding to either possibly
true or unknown.1 This would seem to assume an underlying binary truth-model about which there is only partial or
incomplete knowledge. However, this view is problematic since, as highlighted by Dubois [6], three-valued logics do not
provide an adequate model of ignorance or partial knowledge. For example, even if there is uncertainty concerning the
binary truth-value of a proposition p then the contradiction p ∧ ¬p would still be known to be false since it is false in all
binary valuations. However, for Kleene’s strong logic we can see from Table 1 that if p has the middle truth-value then so
has p ∧ ¬p.
In contrast to the epistemic view, here we are interested in the application of three-valued logic to model truth-gaps
for propositions involving vague concepts. From this perspective a proposition may be known to be borderline. For example,
given absolute certainty about Ethel’s height then we may also be certain that the proposition p = ‘Ethel is tall’ is a
borderline case. The intermediate truth-value of p results then from the inherent ﬂexibility in the concept tall and is
not the result of a lack of knowledge about any underlying binary truth-model. Indeed, from this perspective there is no
underlying binary truth-model since truth valuations on vague propositions are inherently three-valued.
A second model of truth-gaps is supervaluationism as proposed by Fine [10] (see also Williamson [44] for an exposi-
tion).2 In this approach it is assumed that vague concepts have different admissible precise interpretations referred to as
precisiﬁcations. For example, the concept tall may admit a range of admissible threshold values on height, each deﬁning a
different precisiﬁcation of the concept. The simplest formulation of supervaluationism in a propositional logic framework
is in terms of a set of admissible classical (Tarski) valuations. In this case a sentence is said to be supertrue if it is true in
every admissible classical valuation and superfalse if it is false in every admissible valuation (i.e. its negation is supertrue).
1 Shapiro [35] uses the term indeterminate which seems closer to our interpretation.
2 The term supervaluationism was originally introduced by van Fraasen [41] with regard to the truth-gaps which result when some of the terms in a
predicate logic language do not have referents in a particular interpretation.
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valued logic supervaluationism preserves classical tautologies, contradictions and equivalences. For example, even though
proposition p and its negation ¬p may both be borderline cases, p ∨ ¬p and p ∧ ¬p are always supertrue and superfalse
respectively. Furthermore, if two propositional logic sentences are classically equivalent then they are either both supertrue,
both superfalse or both borderline.
The relationship between supervaluationism and models of partial or incomplete knowledge is perhaps less straight-
forward than in the case of three-valued logic. In one sense there clearly is an underlying binary truth-model since
supervaluations are deﬁned in terms of sets of classical valuations. Indeed, sets of valuations have been proposed as a
way of representing incomplete knowledge of an agent’s beliefs. An example of such a model would be Boolean (two-valued)
possibility theory [9,3] in which the necessity or possibility of a sentence is decided on the basis of whether or not it is
respectively a direct consequence of, or consistent with a set of sentences K representing the agent’s incomplete beliefs
about the world. In this context, K can be characterised by the set of valuations for which every sentence in K is true,
and hence a sentence is necessarily true if it is true in every such valuation and possibly true if it is true in some of these
valuations. However, in supervaluationism we are using sets of valuations in a completely different way so as to capture
vagueness rather than partial knowledge. To explain the difference between these two distinct uses of sets of valuations we
shall employ the notions of conjunctive and disjunctive sets [42,5].
A conjunctive set is an inclusive collection of elements representing a conjunctive property, whereas a disjunctive set is
an exclusive collection of elements each representing one of a number of possibilities only one of which can actually be
realised. For example, the set of languages spoken by Ethel is a conjunctive set since each element is equally admissible,
while the set {1, . . . ,6} representing the possible outcomes of a throw of a die is a disjunctive set since, while all outcomes
are possible, only one outcome can be the actual score. We argue then that the sets of valuations in supervaluationism
are conjunctive, while those in Boolean possibility theory are disjunctive. More speciﬁcally, in supervaluationism a set of
valuations identiﬁes a conjunction of interpretations all of which are admissible precisiﬁcations, whereas in Boolean possi-
bility theory the set of valuations correspond to possible epistemic states, only one of which is the true state of the world.
Interestingly, this view of supervaluationism is what Smith [36] refers to as plurivaluationism, according to which a language
has multiple valid interpretations.
In the following sections we introduce valuation pairs as a general model of truth-gaps for sentences from a propositional
language, and which allows for a uniﬁed treatment of supervaluationism and three-valued logics. Such a treatment will
enable us to make a close comparison between the different truth-models, and here we shall focus in particular on the
relationship between supervaluationism and Kleene’s strong logic.
3. Valuation pairs
Valuation pairs provide a direct, and relatively straightforward, model of truth-gaps and indeterminism based on two
primitive truth-states; absolutely true and not absolutely false. These lower and upper truth-states then drive (or are perhaps
motivated by) the type of bipolarity of assertability identiﬁed by Parikh [27] as being fundamental to the use of vague
concepts in natural language. In this section we give the general deﬁnition of valuation pairs and identify a number of
sub-classes of valuations pairs for further study. Initially, however, we recall some basic concepts from propositional logic.
Let L be a language of propositional logic with connectives ∧, ∨ and ¬ and a ﬁnite set of propositional variables
P = {p1, . . . , pn}. Let SL denote the sentences of L generated by recursive application of the connectives to P . We also
deﬁne SL+ as the sentences of L generated recursively from the propositional variables by application of the connectives
∧ and ∨ only, and similarly we let SL− denote the sentences of L generated recursively from the negated propositional
variables by application of ∧ and ∨ only. Here we can think of SL+ as the set of entirely positive sentences and SL− as the
set of entirely negative sentences of L respectively.
Classical valuations are based on Tarski’s binary truth-model as follows:
Deﬁnition 1 (Classical valuations). A classical valuation v is a function v : SL→ {0,1} satisfying ∀θ,ϕ ∈ SL,
• v(¬θ) = 1− v(θ)
• v(θ ∧ ϕ) =min(v(θ), v(ϕ))
• v(θ ∨ ϕ) =max(v(θ), v(ϕ))
A classical valuation is characterised by a subset F ⊆ P so that:
v F (pi) = 1 iff pi ∈ F
On the basis of classical valuations we can then deﬁne the standard propositional logic notions of entailment and equiv-
alence according to which θ |	 ϕ (ϕ follows from θ ) if for all classical valuations v(θ) = 1 implies that v(ϕ) = 1, and θ ≡ ϕ
(θ and ϕ are equivalent) if for all classical valuations v(θ) = v(ϕ). A sentence θ is then a classical tautology (denoted |	 θ )
if v(θ) = 1 in all classical valuations, while θ is a classical contradiction |	 ¬θ if v(θ) = 0 for all classical valuations.
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α =
n∧
i=1
±pi where +pi denotes the propositional pi and −pi denotes the negated propositional variable ¬pi
For atom α ∈ SL let Fα = {pi: α |	 pi}. Also any subset F ⊆ P characterises an atom so that:
αF =
( ∧
pi∈F
pi
)
∧
( ∧
pi /∈F
¬pi
)
By the Disjunctive Normal Form theorem it holds that ∀θ ∈ SL,
θ ≡
∨
F∈Pθ
αF where Pθ =
{
F : v F (θ) = 1
}
Deﬁnition 3 (Valuation pairs). A valuation pair is a pair of functions v = (v, v¯) where v : SL → {0,1} and v¯ : SL → {0,1}
such that v  v¯ . Furthermore, ∀θ,ϕ ∈ SL, if v(θ) = v¯(θ) = α and v(ϕ) = v¯(ϕ) = β then v(¬θ) = v¯(¬θ) = 1−α, v(θ ∧ϕ) =
v¯(θ ∧ ϕ) =min(α,β) and v(θ ∨ ϕ) = v¯(θ ∨ ϕ) =max(α,β).
Intuitively, v and v¯ are valuation functions for the truth-states absolutely true and not absolutely false respectively. The
requirement that v  v¯ formally deﬁnes v as a stronger criterion than v¯ . Hence, a sentence θ ∈ SL is absolutely true only
if it is not absolutely false. However, the converse does not necessarily hold in which case the difference between v¯ and
v is due to inherent vagueness in the sentences of L. So if v¯(θ) − v(θ) = 1 then θ is a borderline case which is neither
absolutely true nor absolutely false. In other words, θ is a sentence which while not deﬁnitely assertable is nonetheless
acceptable to assert. In the case that we restrict ourselves to sentences of L which are not viewed as being borderline it
is assumed that valuation pairs behave like classical valuations as given in Deﬁnition 1. Indeed, from the perspective of
Deﬁnition 3, classical valuations can be viewed as special cases of valuation pairs in which v = v¯ .
In the following deﬁnition we propose supervaluation pairs as a valuation pair model of supervaluationism. A supervalu-
ation pair is deﬁned by a set of classical valuations which, when adopting the set of propositional variables characterisation
of classical valuations outlined above, is represented by a subset P of 2P (i.e. the power set of P ). In this context v(θ) = 1
if and only if sentence θ is true in every admissible classical valuation in P , while v¯(θ) = 1 if and only if θ is true in at
least one classical valuation in P . Clearly then we are identifying the truth-state absolutely true with supertruth and that of
not absolutely false with non-superfalsehood. Upper valuations of the latter kind have been investigated by Hyde [14] who
refers to them as subvaluations.
Deﬁnition 4 (Supervaluation pairs). Let ∅ =P ⊆ 2P then a supervaluation pair v = (v, v¯) generated by P is given by: ∀θ ∈ SL
v(θ) =min{v F (θ): F ∈ P} and v¯(θ) =max{v F (θ): F ∈ P}
In the sequel we will show that supervaluation pairs retain many of the properties of classical valuations including
classical equivalence, so that if θ ≡ ϕ then v(θ) = v(ϕ) for all supervaluation pairs, and classical tautologies, so that if |	 θ
then v(θ) = (1,1) for all supervaluation pairs. Furthermore, supervaluation pairs satisfy the natural duality property that for
sentence θ , v(¬θ) = 1− v¯(θ) and v¯(¬θ) = 1− v(θ). In other words, a sentence is absolutely true if and only if its negation
is absolutely false. An obvious consequence of this and the fact that supervaluation pairs preserve classical tautologies is
that classical contradictions are also preserved.
A supervaluation pair v = (v, v¯) naturally identiﬁes lower and upper sets of propositional variables of the form F = {pi ∈
P : v(pi) = 1} ⊆ F = {pi ∈ P : v¯(pi) = 1}. Notice immediately that for any F ∈ P it must hold that F ⊆ F ⊆ F , however, it
does not necessarily follow from Deﬁnition 4 that either F or F are themselves in P . In the next deﬁnition we identify
bounded supervaluation pairs as the class of supervaluation pairs for which P ⊇ {F , F }. The failure to include F or F in P
has the following interesting consequences. If F /∈ P then v(¬pi) = (0,1) for pi ∈ F − F while v(∧pi∈F−F ¬pi) = (0,0).
In other words, even though the negation of every propositional variable in F − F is a borderline case their conjunction
is absolutely false. Similarly, if F /∈ P , then v(∧pi∈F−F pi) = (0,0). That is, the conjunction of all borderline propositional
variables in L is absolutely false. Hence, for bounded supervaluation pairs we are restricting ourselves to sets of admissible
classical valuations which include a valuation in which all borderline propositional variables are true, and also one in which
they are all false.
Deﬁnition 5 (Bounded supervaluation pairs). A bounded supervaluation pair is a supervaluation pair where ∃F , F ∈ P such
that F ⊆ F and ∀F ∈P , F ⊆ F ⊆ F .
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situation in which an agent’s truth-model is generated solely by them considering propositional variables, and by identifying
those propositional variables which are absolutely true and those which are not absolutely false. The agent then simply
identiﬁes the set of admissible valuations as being all those classical valuations consistent with these lower and upper
valuations of the propositional variables.
Deﬁnition 6 (Complete bounded supervaluation pairs). A complete bounded supervaluation pair is a bounded supervaluation
pair where P = {F : F ⊆ F ⊆ F }.
An alternative approach to deﬁning valuation pairs is via compositional rules for each of the connectives. In particular,
Kleene valuation pairs are deﬁned in terms of an explicit duality rule for negation together with min and max combination
operators for conjunction and disjunction respectively. Kleene valuation pairs have already been deﬁned in [23], where some
of their basic properties were described.
Deﬁnition 7 (Kleene valuation pairs). A Kleene valuation pair is a valuation pair v = (v, v¯) such that ∀θ,ϕ ∈ SL the following
hold:
• v(¬θ) = 1− v¯(θ) and v¯(¬θ) = 1− v(θ)
• v(θ ∧ ϕ) =min(v(θ), v(ϕ)) and v¯(θ ∧ ϕ) =min(v¯(θ), v¯(ϕ))
• v(θ ∨ ϕ) =max(v(θ), v(ϕ)) and v¯(θ ∨ ϕ) =max(v¯(θ), v¯(ϕ))
There is a natural link between Kleene valuation pairs and Kleene’s strong three-valued logic [16]. This can be seen
clearly when we view the three possible values of a valuation pair for a sentence as truth-values, i.e. t= (1,1) as absolutely
true, b = (0,1) as borderline and f = (0,0) as absolutely false. If we then view a valuation pair as a function v : SL → T
where T = {(0,0), (0,1), (1,1)} then Kleene valuation pairs as given in Deﬁnition 7, satisfy the truth-tables for Kleene’s
strong three-valued logic as described in Section 2, Table 1.
In contrast to supervaluation pairs, Kleene valuation pairs do not preserve classical tautologies and contradictions. Indeed
from a well-known property of Kleene’s strong logic there are no sentences θ for which v(θ) = (1,1) for all Kleene valuation
pairs. However, the laws of excluded middle and non-contradiction are at least partially preserved since θ ∨ ¬θ is not
absolutely false and θ ∧ ¬θ is not absolutely true for all Kleene valuation pairs. Furthermore, Kleene valuation pairs do not
preserve all classical equivalences. For example, consider a Kleene valuation pair for which v(p1) = (0,0) and v(p2) = (0,1).
In this case v(p1 ∨ (p2 ∧ ¬p2)) = (0,1) = (0,0) = v(p1). However, a number of classical equivalences are preserved [23]
including, de Morgan’s laws, double negation, idempotence, commutativity, associativity and distributivity.
Notice, that classical valuation pairs can be viewed as special cases of both Kleene and supervaluation pairs in which
v = v¯ . Of course many other classes of valuation pairs can also be deﬁned including, for example, valuation pairs related
to Lukasiewicz three-valued logic.3 However, for the scope of this paper we will focus on supervaluation pairs and Kleene
valuation pairs, so as to explore the relationship between them. In the following section we will investigate axiomatic justi-
ﬁcations for both these families of valuation pairs in terms of a set of ‘desirable’ properties for lower and upper valuations.
Initially, however, we introduce notation for sets of valuation pairs of different classes.
Deﬁnition 8 (Classes of valuation pairs).
• Let V denote the set of all valuation pairs on L.
• Let Vc denote the set of all classical valuations on L.
• Let Vs denote the set of all supervaluation pairs on L.
• Let Vbs ⊆Vs denote the set of all bounded supervaluation pairs on L.
• Let Vcbs ⊆Vbs denote the set of complete bounded supervaluation pairs on L.
• Let Vk denote the set of Kleene valuation pairs on L.
3.1. Axioms for valuation pairs
Here we introduce a number of elementary properties which it might be considered desirable for a valuation pair to
satisfy. The aim is to provide an axiomatic characterisation of some of the classes of valuation pairs introduced in the
previous subsection, in terms of a small number of basic requirements for truth-models of indeterminacy.
VP1 (Duality) ∀θ ∈ SL, v(¬θ) = 1− v¯(θ) and v¯(¬θ) = 1− v(θ).
3 Lukasiewicz valuation pairs can be deﬁned such that: v(¬θ) = 1 − v¯(θ) and v¯(¬θ) = 1 − v(θ), v(θ ∧ ϕ) = min(v(θ), v(ϕ)) and v¯(θ ∧ ϕ) =
max(min(v(θ), v¯(ϕ)),min(v¯(θ), v(ϕ))) and v(θ ∨ ϕ) =min(max(v(θ), v¯(ϕ)),max(v¯(θ), v(ϕ))) and v¯(θ ∨ ϕ) =max(v¯(θ), v¯(ϕ)).
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VP3 (Equivalence) If θ ≡ ϕ (i.e. θ and ϕ are classically equivalent) then v(θ) = v(ϕ).
VP4 (Maximum Upper) ∀θ,ϕ ∈ SL, v¯(θ ∨ ϕ) =max(v¯(θ), v¯(ϕ)).
VP5 (Maximum Lower) ∀θ,ϕ ∈ SL, v(θ ∨ ϕ) =max(v(θ), v(ϕ)).
VP1 is simply the duality property for negation already discussed above, in which it is required that a sentence is abso-
lutely true if and only if its negation is absolutely false. VP2 and VP3 require the preservation of classical tautologies and
equivalences. Also, notice that when taken together with VP1, VP2 also implies the preservation of classical contradictions.
The fundamental idea here is that valuation pairs are simply a generalisation of classical valuations so as to admit indeter-
minacy, and there is no reason that such a generalisation should result in a change to the underlying logical equivalences
between sentences of the language. Furthermore, if a sentence is universally true across all interpretations of the language in
which the underlying concepts are assumed to be crisp, then it should also be absolutely true in any interpretation which ad-
mits borderline cases. This claim has been vigorously contested by proponents of many-valued and inﬁnitely-valued (fuzzy)
logic who argue that there is nothing particularly special about the tautologies and equivalences of classical logic requiring
them to be accorded special status above those of any other internally consistent logic. Indeed, they argue that admitting
additional truth-values fundamentally changes the semantics of the language so that we should not be surprised if the
resulting logic has different tautologies and equivalences.
VP4 requires that a disjunction should be not absolutely false when at least one of its disjuncts is not absolutely false.
Furthermore, this should be the only manner in which a disjunction is not absolutely false. In other words, a disjunction
should be absolutely false exactly when both of its disjuncts are absolutely false. Together with VP1, VP4 seems perhaps the
least controversial of the properties. VP5 again relates to disjunctions of sentences requiring that a disjunction is absolutely
true exactly when at least one of its disjuncts is absolutely true. However, there is an inherent tension between this require-
ment and VP2. To see this suppose that we have a valuation pair for which v(p) = (0,1) and, as would be required by
VP1, also v(¬p) = (0,1). If in this case VP5 holds then v(p ∨ ¬p) = 0 contradicting VP2. Notice there is no problem here
with the requirement that a disjunction with at least one absolutely true disjunct is itself absolutely true, but rather with
the requirement that this is the only way in which a disjunction can be absolutely true. In other words, there is no tension
between VP2 and the weaker requirement that v(θ ∨ϕ)max(v(θ), v(ϕ)). Finally, notice that assuming VP1 holds together
with de Morgan’s laws then VP4 and VP5 imply dual constraints on conjunctions of the form v(θ ∧ ϕ) = min(v(θ), v(ϕ))
and v¯(θ ∧ ϕ) =min(v¯(θ), v¯(ϕ)) respectively.
The following results show that VP1 through to VP4 provide a characterisation of supervaluation pairs.
Theorem 9. If v ∈ V satisﬁes axioms VP1 through to VP4 then ∃∅ = P ⊆ 2P such that ∀θ ∈ SL, v(θ) = min{v F (θ): F ∈ P} and
v¯(θ) =max{v F (θ): F ∈P}, i.e. v is a supervaluation pair.
Proof. Let P = {Fα j : v¯(α j) = 1}. Notice that P = ∅ since if P = ∅ then by the deﬁnition of P we have that ∀α j , v¯(α j) = 0⇒ by deﬁnition of valuation pairs v(α j) = 0. Therefore, by VP1 we for any atom α j that v¯(¬α j) = 1. However, ¬α j ≡∨
k = j αk and therefore by VP3 and VP4 we have that
v¯(¬α j) = v¯
(∨
k = j
αk
)
=max{v¯(αk): k = j}= 0
This is a contradiction.
Now suppose θ is a tautology then by VP2 it holds that v(θ) = (1,1). Also ∀F ⊆ P it holds that v F (θ) = 1. Therefore,
min{v F (θ): F ∈ P} = max{v F (θ): F ∈ P} = 1 as required. Now suppose θ is not a tautology so that Pθ = ∅ and P¬θ = ∅.
We consider three cases:
v(θ) = (0,0)
v(θ) = (0,0) ⇒ (by VP3) v
( ∨
F∈Pθ
αF
)
= (0,0) ⇒ v¯
( ∨
F∈Pθ
αF
)
= 0
⇒ (by VP4) max{v¯(αF ): F ∈ Pθ}= 0 ⇒ ∀F ∈ Pθ , v¯(αF ) = 0
and hence by deﬁnition of P it follows that
Pθ ∩P = ∅ ⇒ ∀F ∈ P, v F (θ) = 0 ⇒ min
{
v F (θ): F ∈ P
}=max{v F (θ): F ∈ P}= 0
as required.
v(θ) = (0,1)
Suppose that ∀F ∈P v F (θ) = 1⇒P ⊆Pθ ⇒ ∀F ∈Pcθ (=P¬θ ), v¯(αF ) = 0 (by the deﬁnition of P). Now by VP3 and VP4
v¯(¬θ) = v¯
( ∨
αF
)
=max{v¯(αF ): F ∈ P¬θ}= 0 ⇒ v(θ) = 1 (by axiom VP1)F∈P¬θ
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Alternatively suppose that ∀F ∈ P , v F (θ) = 0 ⇒ ∀F ∈ P , v F (¬θ) = 1 ⇒ P ⊆ P¬θ ⇒ ∀F ∈ Pθ , v¯(αF ) = 0 by deﬁnition
of P . Now by VP3 and VP4
v¯(θ) = v¯
( ∨
F∈Pθ
αF
)
=max{v¯(αF ): F ∈ Pθ}= 0
This is a contradiction and therefore ∃F ∈P, v F (θ) = 1⇒max{v F (θ): F ∈P} = 1 as required.
v(θ) = (1,1)
Suppose ∃F ∈ P such that v F (θ) = 0 ⇒ ∃F ∈ P such that αF |	 θ (i.e. F ∈ P¬θ ) ⇒ ∃F ∈ P ∩P¬θ ⇒ by the deﬁnition of P
that ∃F ∈P¬θ such that v¯(αF ) = 1⇒ by VP3 and VP4 that
v¯(¬θ) =max{v¯(αF ): F ∈ P¬θ}= 1
⇒ v(θ) = 0 by VP1 which is a contradiction. Hence ∀F ∈ P, v F (θ) = 1
⇒ min{v F (θ): F ∈ P}=max{v F (θ): F ∈ P}= 1
as required. 
Corollary 10. A valuation pair v satisﬁes VP1 to VP4 if and only if v is a supervaluation pair.
Proof. From Theorem 9 it only remains to show that supervaluation pairs satisfy VP1 to VP4. This follows trivially from the
deﬁnition of supervaluation pairs. 
From our earlier discussions it is clear that supervaluation pairs do not, in general, satisfy VP5. This is because they do
satisfy VP2 and that there are clearly examples of supervaluation pairs for which v(p) = v(¬p) = (0,1) for some proposi-
tional variable p (e.g. take P = {{p},∅}).
In the following results we show that, taken together with de Morgan’s laws, VP1, VP4 and VP5 provide a characterisation
of Kleene valuation pairs.
Theorem 11. If v ∈V satisﬁes VP1, VP4, VP5 and de Morgan’s laws then v is a Kleene valuation pair.
Proof. It is suﬃcient to show that ∀θ,ϕ ∈ SL, v(θ ∧ ϕ) = min(v(θ), v(ϕ)) and v¯(θ ∧ ϕ) = min(v¯(θ), v¯(ϕ)). By VP1 v¯(θ ∧
ϕ) = 1− v(¬(θ ∧ϕ)) = 1− v(¬θ ∨¬ϕ) by de Morgan’s laws = 1−max(v(¬θ), v(¬ϕ)) by VP5 = 1−max(1− v(θ),1− v(ϕ))
by VP1 =min(v(θ), v(ϕ)). The result for v(θ ∧ ϕ) follows similarly. 
Corollary 12. A valuation pair v ∈V satisﬁes VP1, VP4, VP5 and de Morgan’s laws if and only if v is a Kleene valuation pair.
Proof. From Theorem 11 and Deﬁnition 7 we need only show that Kleene valuation pairs satisfy de Morgan’s laws. This is
proved in [23]. 
We now deﬁne semantic precision as a natural partial ordering on V. This concerns the situation in which one valuation
pair admits more borderline cases than another but where otherwise their truth valuations agree. More formally, valuation
pair v1 is less semantically precise than v2 if they disagree only for some set of sentences of L, which being identiﬁed as
either absolutely true or absolutely false by v2, are classiﬁed as being borderline cases by v1. In other words, v1 is less
semantically precise than v2 if all of the absolutely true and absolutely false valuations of v1 are preserved by v2.
Deﬁnition 13 (Semantic precision). ∀v1, v2 ∈V, v1  v2 if and only if ∀θ ∈ SL, v1(θ) v2(θ) and v¯1(θ) v¯2(θ).
We might now think of the disagreement between two valuation pairs related by  as intuitively being less than that
of two unrelated valuation pairs. Indeed, if v1  v2 then another perspective is to think of v2 being generated as a precisi-
ﬁcation (in the general sense) of v1 by, perhaps even arbitrarily, classifying some of the borderline cases identiﬁed by v1
as either being absolutely true or absolutely false. The following two results show alternative characterisations of semantic
precision both for Kleene valuation pairs and supervaluation pairs. In the latter case notice that v1  v2 exactly when the
ﬁrst interpretation is a precisiﬁcation of the second in the sense of Fine [10]. Indeed, Shapiro [35] proposes a version of this
ordering for Kleene’s strong logic which be refers to as sharpening, where v1  v2 means that v2 extends or sharpens v1.
Theorem 14. (See [23].) ∀v1, v2 ∈ Vk, v1  v2 if and only if {pi ∈ P : v1(pi) = 1} ⊆ {pi ∈ P : v2(pi) = 1} and {pi ∈ P : v¯1(pi) =
1} ⊇ {pi ∈ P : v¯2(pi) = 1}.
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For Theorem 14 the proof follows trivially by induction on the complexity of sentences in SL, while Theorem 15 follows
immediately from the deﬁnition of supervaluation pairs.
3.2. Relating Kleene and supervaluation pairs
In this section we investigate the relationship between Kleene valuation pairs and bounded supervaluation pairs. In
particular, we will show that for every bounded supervaluation pair there is a less semantically precise Kleene valuation
pair with the same values on the sets of entirely positive and entirely negative sentences of L. The following two initial
lemmas prove useful nestedness properties for classical valuations when restricted to sentences in SL+ and SL− .
Lemma 16. If θ ∈ SL+ and F ⊆ F ′ ⊆ P then v F (θ) = 1 implies that v F ′ (θ) = 1.
Proof. Let SL+,0 = P and SL+,n = SL+,n−1 ∪{θ ∧ϕ, θ ∨ϕ: θ,ϕ ∈ SL+,n−1}. Then by induction on n we have the following.
For pi ∈ P , v F (pi) = 1 ⇒ pi ∈ F ⇒ pi ∈ F ′ ⇒ v F ′ (pi) = 1. Now suppose Ψ ∈ SL+,n+1 then either Ψ ∈ SL+,n in which
case the result follows trivially or ∃θ,ϕ ∈ SL+,n and one of the following holds:
• Ψ = θ ∧ ϕ: In this case v F (θ ∧ ϕ) = 1 ⇒ v F (θ) = 1 and v F (ϕ) = 1 ⇒ (by induction) v F ′ (θ) = 1 and v F ′ (ϕ) = 1
⇒ v F ′ (θ ∧ ϕ) = 1 as required.
• Ψ = θ ∨ ϕ: In this case v F (θ ∨ ϕ) = 1 ⇒ v F (θ) = 1 or v F (ϕ) = 1 ⇒ (by induction) v F ′ (θ) = 1 or v F ′ (ϕ) = 1 ⇒
v F ′ (θ ∨ ϕ) = 1 as required. 
Lemma 17. If θ ∈ SL− and F ′ ⊆ F ⊆ P then v F (θ) = 1 implies that v F ′ (θ) = 1.
Proof. The proof mirrors that of Lemma 16 but with induction on the complexity of sentences in SL− instead of SL+ . 
The next result shows that for any bounded supervaluation pair its value on strictly positive or strictly negative sentences
is determined entirely from its lower and upper admissible valuations. In other words, it has the same value on SL+ ∪ SL−
as the bounded supervaluation pair which admits only these lower and upper valuations.
Theorem 18. Let v ∈ Vbs be a bounded supervaluation pair with lower and upper admissible valuations F and F and let v ′ be the
bounded supervaluation pair for which P ′ = {F , F } then ∀θ ∈ SL+ ∪ SL− , v(θ) = v ′(θ).
Proof. For θ ∈ SL+: If v¯(θ) = 1⇒ ∃F ∈P such that v F (θ) = 1⇒ v F (θ) = 1 by Lemma 16 ⇒ v¯ ′(θ) = 1. Also, if v¯ ′(θ) = 1⇒
v F (θ) = 1⇒ ∃F ∈P such that v F (θ) = 1⇒ v¯(θ) = 1.
If v(θ) = 1⇒ ∀F ∈P , v F (θ) = 1⇒ v F (θ) = 1 and v F (θ) = 1⇒ v ′(θ) = 1. Also, if v ′(θ) = 1⇒ v F (θ) = 1⇒ by Lemma 16∀F ∈P , v F (θ) = 1⇒ v(θ) = 1.
For θ ∈ SL− the result follows similarly from Lemma 17 by swapping the roles of F and F in the above argument. 
Notice, however, it is not generally the case that for θ ∈ SL − (SL+ ∪ SL−), v(θ) = v ′(θ) as can be seen from the
following example:
Example 19. Let P = {{p1}, {p1, p2}, {p1, p2, p3}} so that P ′ = {{p1}, {p1, p2, p3}}. In this case v¯(p2∧¬p3) = 1 while v¯ ′(p2∧
¬p3) = 0.
We now show that for entirely positive and entirely negative sentences, bounded supervaluation pairs satisfy property
VP5, i.e. that a disjunction is absolutely true exactly when at least one of its disjuncts is absolutely true. Furthermore, in
this case we also have the dual result that a conjunction is not absolutely false exactly when both of its conjuncts are not
absolutely false.
Theorem 20. Let v ∈Vbs be a bounded supervaluation pair then ∀θ,ϕ ∈ SL+ and ∀θ,ϕ ∈ SL− it holds that:
v¯(θ ∧ ϕ) =min(v¯(θ), v¯(ϕ)) and v(θ ∨ ϕ) =max(v(θ), v(ϕ))
Proof. As before let P ′ = {F , F } then for θ,ϕ ∈ SL+ , v¯(θ ∧ ϕ) = 1 iff v¯ ′(θ ∧ ϕ) = 1 by Theorem 18 iff v F (θ ∧ ϕ) = 1 by
Lemma 16 iff v F (θ) = 1 and v F (ϕ) = 1 iff v¯ ′(θ) = 1 and v¯ ′(ϕ) = 1 by Lemma 16 iff v¯(θ) = 1 and v¯(ϕ) = 1 by Theorem 18
as required.
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v ′(θ) = 1 or v ′(ϕ) = 1 by Lemma 16 iff v(θ) = 1 or v(ϕ) = 1 by Theorem 18 as required.
For θ,ϕ ∈ SL− the result follows similarly from Lemma 17 by swapping the roles of F and F in the above argument. 
Theorem 21. Let vbs ∈ Vbs be a bounded supervaluation pair then there exists a unique Kleene valuation pair vk such that vk  vbs
and ∀θ ∈ SL+ ∪ SL− , vk(θ) = vbs(θ).
Proof. We deﬁne vk ∈Vk such that ∀pi ∈ P let vk(pi) = 1 iff pi ∈ F and v¯k(pi) = 1 iff pi ∈ F , where F and F are the lower
and upper sets of admissible valuations for vbs .
Firstly, we show that ∀θ ∈ SL+ ∪ SL− , vk(θ) = vbs(θ). Here we prove this result for sentences in SL+ , and the result for
SL− follows similarly. The proof is by induction as follows. For pi ∈ P the result follows trivially. Now suppose Ψ ∈ SL+,n+1
then either Ψ ∈ SL+,n in which case the result follows trivially or ∃θ,ϕ ∈ SL+,n and one of the following holds:
• Ψ = θ ∧ϕ: vk(θ ∧ϕ) =min(vk(θ), vk(ϕ)) by deﬁnition of Kleene valuation pairs =min(vbs(θ), vbs(ϕ)) by the inductive
hypothesis = vbs(θ ∧ ϕ) by a basic property of supervaluation pairs. Also, v¯k(θ ∧ ϕ) = min(v¯k(θ), v¯k(ϕ)) by deﬁnition
of Kleene valuation pairs =min(v¯bs(θ), v¯bs(ϕ)) by the inductive hypothesis = v¯bs(θ ∧ ϕ) by Theorem 20.
• Ψ = θ ∨ϕ: vk(θ ∨ϕ) =max(vk(θ), vk(ϕ)) by deﬁnition of Kleene valuation pairs =max(vbs(θ), vbs(ϕ)) by the inductive
hypothesis = vbs(θ ∨ ϕ) by Theorem 20. Also, v¯k(θ ∨ ϕ) = max(v¯k(θ), v¯k(ϕ)) by deﬁnition of Kleene valuation pairs
=max(v¯bs(θ), v¯bs(ϕ)) by the inductive hypothesis = v¯bs(θ ∨ ϕ) by a basic property of supervaluation pairs.
To see that vk deﬁned as above is the only Kleene valuation agreeing with vbs for all sentences in SL+ ∪ SL− note that if
∀pi ∈ P , vk(pi) = vbs(pi) then vk(pi) = 1 iff vbs(pi) = 1 iff pi ∈ F and v¯k(pi) = 1 iff v¯bs(pi) = 1 iff pi ∈ F .
We now show that vk  vbs , for vk deﬁned as above. The proof is by induction as follows: If Ψ ∈ SL0 then Ψ = pi ∈ P .
Clearly, by the deﬁnition of vk , vk(pi) = vbs(pi) and so the result follows trivially in this case. Now suppose Ψ ∈ SLn+1
then either Ψ ∈ SLn in which case the result follows trivially or ∃θ,ϕ ∈ SLn such that one of the following holds:
• Ψ = θ ∧ ϕ: In this case, if vk(θ ∧ ϕ) = 1 then min(vk(θ), vk(θ)) = 1 which implies that vk(θ) = 1 and vk(ϕ) = 1.
Hence, by induction, vbs(θ) = 1 and vbs(ϕ) = 1 which implies that vbs(θ ∧ ϕ) = 1 as required. Also, if v¯bs(θ ∧ ϕ) = 1
then v¯bs(θ) = 1 and v¯bs(ϕ) = 1 which implies, by induction, that v¯k(θ) = 1 and v¯k(ϕ) = 1. Hence, min(v¯k(θ), v¯k(ϕ)) =
v¯k(θ ∧ ϕ) = 1 as required.
• Ψ = θ ∨ϕ: In this case, if vk(θ ∨ϕ) = 1 then max(vk(θ), vk(θ)) = 1 which implies that vk(θ) = 1 or vk(ϕ) = 1. Hence, by
induction, vbs(θ) = 1 or vbs(ϕ) = 1 which implies that vbs(θ ∨ϕ) = 1 as required. Also, if v¯bs(θ ∨ϕ) = 1 then v¯bs(θ) = 1
or v¯bs(ϕ) = 1 which implies, by induction, that v¯k(θ) = 1 or v¯k(ϕ) = 1. Hence, max(v¯k(θ), v¯k(ϕ)) = v¯k(θ ∨ ϕ) = 1 as
required.
• Ψ = ¬θ : In this case, if vk(¬θ) = 1 then v¯k(θ) = 0, which implies, by induction, that v¯bs(θ) = 0. Hence, vbs(¬θ) = 1
as required. Also, if v¯bs(¬θ) = 1 then vbs(θ) = 0 which implies, by induction, that vk(θ) = 0. Hence, v¯k(¬θ) = 1 as
required. 
There are a number of different possible viewpoints from which we can interpret Theorem 21. One perspective might be
that in some sense bounded supervaluation pairs provide a better model of truth-gaps than Kleene valuation pairs, perhaps
on the basis of the axiomatic characterisations given in Section 3.1. In this case we could view the Kleene valuation pair vk
identiﬁed in Theorem 21 as a less semantically precise approximation of vbs , agreeing with vbs on an important subclass
of sentences. Such an approximation might be advantageous on computational grounds because Kleene valuation pairs are
truth-functional, while bounded supervaluation pairs are not even functional in a weaker sense. We will consider this issue
in more detail in the following section.
An alternative perspective would be to simply view Kleene valuation pair vk as a more vague interpretation of L for
which Theorem 21 identiﬁes a set of bounded supervaluation pairs as different precisiﬁcations. More formally, given Kleene
valuation pair vk ∈ Vk for which F = {pi: vk(pi) = 1} and F = {pi: v¯k(pi) = 1} then we can identify the class of bounded
supervaluation pairs with lower and upper admissible valuations F and F , given by:
[[F , F ]] = {vbs ∈Vbs: {pi: vbs(pi) = 1}= F ,{pi: v¯bs(pi) = 1}= F}
Now Theorem 21 identiﬁes the same Kleene valuation pair vk for each bounded supervaluation pair in [[F , F ]]. Hence, we
might think of [[F , F ]] as a natural class of precisiﬁcations of vk .
Interestingly, the class [[F , F ]] also provides us with some insight into the relationship between bounded supervaluation
pairs and complete bounded supervaluation pairs. Notice that as F ⊆ F range across all possible such pairs of subsets of P ,
then the sets [[F , F ]] form a partition of Vbs . Also, each complete bounded supervaluation pair vcbs ∈ Vcbs is a member of
exactly one of these sets. In fact, if vcbs has lower and upper admissible valuations F and F then vcbs ∈ [[F , F ]] and by
Theorem 15 ∀vbs ∈ [[F , F ]], vcbs  vbs . Hence, ∀θ ∈ SL,
vcbs(θ) =min
{
vbs(θ): vbs ∈ [[F , F ]]
}
and v¯cbs(θ) =max
{
v¯bs(θ): vbs ∈ [[F , F ]]
}
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in summary, we have that for every partition set of bounded supervaluation pairs [[F , F ]] there are both a unique Kleene
valuation pair and a unique complete bounded supervaluation pair which are less semantically precise than all the valuation
pairs in this set, but which agree with all of them on the sentences of SL+ ∪ SL− .
In the following section we consider the representational power of supervaluation pairs, bounded and complete bounded
supervaluation pairs, and Kleene valuation pairs, with particular regard to penumbral connections.
3.3. Penumbral connections
Fine [10] highlights the capacity to capture penumbral connections as a signiﬁcant advantage of supervaluationist the-
ories of vagueness over many-valued logics. Penumbral connections are deﬁned to be those ‘logical relations [that] hold
between indeﬁnite sentences’ [10]. In particular, given a set of borderline literals, penumbral connections may ensure that
certain conjunctions or disjunctions of these literals are nonetheless absolutely true or absolutely false. For example, sup-
pose we have a sequence of heights h1 < h2 < · · · < hn where only h1 is classed as being absolutely not tall, and only
hn is absolutely tall, so that all other heights are borderline cases of tall. However, despite their borderline status, if we
were to learn that hi was indeed tall for any i ∈ {2, . . . ,n − 1} we would immediately infer that hi+1 was also tall, sim-
ply because hi+1 > hi . More formally, let pi denote the proposition ‘a person of height hi is tall’ then we can capture the
above penumbral connections by the supervaluation pair where P = {{p2, . . . , pn}, . . . , {pi, . . . , pn}, . . . , {pn−1, pn}, {pn}}. In
this case, v(p1) = (0,0), v(pn) = (1,1) and v(pi) = (0,1) for i = 2, . . . ,n − 1. Furthermore, v(pi → pi+1) = (1,1)4 for
i = 1, . . . ,n − 1. Notice that this is a bounded supervaluation pair with F = {pn} and F = {p2, . . . , pn} but it is not a com-
plete bounded supervaluation pair. Indeed, the complete bounded supervaluation pair generated by F and F as above, would
loose the semantic information about the penumbral connections between p1, . . . , pn since it would, by deﬁnition, contain
other admissible valuations consistent with pi ∧ ¬p j for j > i.
Another type of penumbral connections concerns two propositional variables which are exclusive and exhaustive, but
where both are borderline cases. Fine [10] uses the example of colours red and pink, suggesting that a given object on the
borderline of these two colours must nonetheless be described as one or the other but not both. Suppose then that we
have two borderline propositions p1 and p2, for which p1 ∧ p2 is absolutely false and p1 ∨ p2 is absolutely true. In order
for a supervaluation pair to capture this semantic information we would require the following: 1) ∀F ∈ P either p1 ∈ F or
p2 ∈ F but {p1, p2} F , and 2) ∃F , F ′ ∈P such that p1 ∈ F and p2 ∈ F ′ . However, a set of admissible valuations with these
properties cannot deﬁne a bounded supervaluation pair. To see this notice that taking F = {pi ∈ P : v¯(pi) = 1}, it follows
that {p1, p2} ⊆ F and therefore F /∈P .
The above examples provide some illustration of the loss of representational power resulting from restricting general
supervaluation pairs to either bounded or complete bounded supervaluation pairs. Whilst Corollary 10 means that any
penumbral connections resulting from classical equivalences, tautologies or contradictions can be captured by all super-
valuation pairs, restricting ourselves to bounded and then complete bounded supervaluation pairs successively limits the
type of penumbral connections which can be captured. Kleene valuation pairs have even less capacity for representing
the type of penumbral connections we have outlined here. Indeed, even connections represented by classical equiva-
lences, tautologies and contradictions cannot in general be captured. For example, there is no Kleene valuation pair where
v(θ) = v(¬θ) = (0,1) but where v(θ ∧ ¬θ) = (0,0) and v(θ ∨ ¬θ) = (1,1). In the next section, however, we will argue
that, despite the reduction in capacity for representing penumbral connections, there are some computational advantage of
restricting ourselves to bounded or complete bounded supervaluation pairs, or indeed even to Kleene valuation pairs.
3.4. Functionality and truth-functionality of valuation pairs
Truth-functionality or compositionality is a fundamental aspect of most classical formal systems. The truth-value of any
compound expression, it is assumed, can be determined from the truth-values of its components by means of a recursive
process dependent of the logical structure of that expression. This provides a computationally feasible method for determin-
ing truth-values with a computational cost bounded by the number of independent occurrences of connectives in the given
formula. Furthermore, an agent is only required to identify truth-values for the primitives in the language; in this case the
propositional variables.
In this section we consider the issue of truth-functionality for valuation pairs together with a weaker form of functional-
ity. For the latter, rather than assuming that valuations are determined from mappings based directly around the connectives
of the language, we require only that, for each sentence θ , a function can be identiﬁed which determines the valuation of θ
on the basis of the valuations for the propositional variables only. Such an assumption restricts the necessity of direct truth
evaluations to the propositional variables which can at least potentially limit an agent’s storage (or memory) requirements.
However, as we shall see the computational cost of evaluating a sentence can, in the worst case, remain high.
4 Here pi → p j is used as shorthand for ¬pi ∨ p j .
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Deﬁnition 22 (Functionality). Let T = {(0,0), (0,1), (1,1)}. Then a class of valuation pairs V′ ⊆ V is functional if ∀θ ∈ SL
there exists a function fθ : Tn → T such that:
∀v ∈V′, v(θ) = fθ
(v(p1), . . . , v(pn))
Deﬁnition 23 (Truth-functionality). A class of valuation pairs V′ ⊆ V is truth-functional if there are functions f∧ : T2 → T,
f∨ : T2 → T and f¬ : T→ T such that ∀θ,ϕ ∈ SL and ∀v ∈V′:
v(¬θ) = f¬
(v(θ)), v(θ ∧ ϕ) = f∧(v(θ), v(ϕ)), and v(θ ∨ ϕ) = f∨(v(θ), v(ϕ))
Naturally any class of valuation pairs which are truth-functional are also functional. For example, Kleene valuation pairs
are truth-functional. However, the following example shows that in general supervaluation pairs are not functional.
Example 24. Let P = {p1, p2, p3} and v1 and v2 be supervaluation pairs with sets of admissible valuations P1 =
{{p1}, {p2}, {p3}} and P2 = {{p1, p2}, {p3}} respectively. Now for both v1 and v2 we have that v1(p1) = v2(p1) = (0,1),
v1(p2) = v2(p2) = (0,1) and v1(p3) = v2(p3) = (0,1). But v1(p1 ∧ p2) = (0,0) while v2(p1 ∧ p2) = (0,1).
In fact it is not even the case that the restricted class of bounded supervaluation pairs are functional as can be seen
from the following example:
Example 25. Let P = {p1, p2, p3} and v1 and v2 be bounded supervaluation pairs with sets of admissible valuations P1 =
{{p1}, {p1, p2}, {p1, p2, p3}} and P2 = {{p1}, {p1, p3}, {p1, p2, p3}} respectively. For both v1 and v2 we have that v1(p1) =
v2(p1) = (1,1), v1(p2) = v2(p2) = (0,1) and v1(p3) = v2(p3) = (0,1). However, for θ = p1∧ p2∧¬p3 we have that v1(θ) =
(0,1) while v2(θ) = (0,0).
On the other hand, complete bounded supervaluation pairs are functional as we can see from the following argument: If
v ∈Vcbs then if we know v(pi) for i = 1, . . . ,n then we can determine the lower and upper admissible valuations according
to:
F = {pi: v(pi) = 1} and F = {pi: v¯(pi) = 1}
and consequently we can deﬁne for any θ ∈ SL, fθ : Tn → T such that:
fθ
(v(p1), . . . , v(pn))= (min{v F (θ): F ⊆ F ⊆ F},max{v F (θ): F ⊆ F ⊆ F})
However, as the next result shows, no class of supervaluation pairs which strictly extends classical valuations is truth-
functional.
Theorem 26. Let Vc ⊂V′ ⊆Vs then the class of supervaluation pairs V′ is not truth-functional.
Proof. Since V′ ⊃ Vc then there exists v ∈ V′ with admissible valuations P ⊇ {F , F ′} where F = F ′ . Now w.l.o.g. we can
assume that ∃pi ∈ F such that pi /∈ F ′ . Hence, v(pi) = (0,1), v(¬pi) = (0,1) but v(pi ∧ pi) = (0,1) while v(pi ∧ ¬pi) =
(0,0). Hence, V′ is not truth-functional. 
Given all of the above we can now consider the computational cost of truth evaluations for different classes of valuation
pairs, from the perspective of the functionality and truth-functionality properties. If a sentence θ has m distinct occurrences
of the connectives then for any truth-functional class V′ the computational cost of evaluating v(θ) is O(m).5 For non-truth-
functional V′ this cost can be much higher. For example, if v ∈ Vs then the cost of evaluating v(θ) is, in the worst case,
O(m|P|), i.e. the combined cost of evaluating the truth-value of θ for every admissible classical valuation in P .6 Indeed,
this is also true for complete bounded supervaluation pairs, even though their functionality means that P does not need
to be stored directly but can be determined from the valuations on propositional variables. However, these are worst case
costs and in many situations evaluating valuation pairs can be much more computationally feasible. For instance, notice
that from Theorem 20 it follows that for sentences restricted to SL+ or SL− bounded supervaluation pairs are effectively
truth-functional with f∧ = min and f∨ = max. Also, recall from Theorem 21 that any bounded supervaluation pair can be
‘approximated’ by a semantically less precise but fully truth-functional Kleene valuation pair.
5 This is of course assuming no cost for evaluating the connective functions f¬ , f∧ and f∨ .
6 This worst case occurs when determining the valuation pair values of a sentence θ which is either absolutely true or absolutely false. In such a case
the truth-value of θ must be calculated for every admissible valuation in P , with a cost for each valuation dependent on the number of connectives in θ .
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Recall, as discussed in Section 2, that there is a clear distinction between indeterminism and epistemic uncertainty. For
vague concepts, truth-gaps are an integral part of the underlying truth-model and do not result from lack of knowledge
about any of the relevant attributes involved in the concept deﬁnitions. In particular, borderline cases do not model uncer-
tainty, and indeed an agent can be certain that a particular proposition is a borderline case. For example, a given height
may deﬁnitely be a borderline case of the predicate tall. Similarly, learning that the proposition ‘Bill is tall’ is borderline
is informative since it suggests that Bill’s height is a borderline case of the concept tall and hence provides information
about its actual value. On the other hand, learning that the truth-value of ‘Bill is tall’ is uncertain or unknown provides
no information about Bill’s height. Hence, from this perspective, valuation pairs provide a truth-model incorporating truth-
gaps and not a three-valued representation of uncertainty. This is in contrast to a signiﬁcant proportion of the literature on
three-valued logic which tends to use the third truth-value to represent ‘unknown’ [6].
In view of the above distinction, it is natural to propose a combined model incorporating both indeterminism and
epistemic uncertainty in order to represent an agent’s subjective beliefs concerning sentences which involve vague concepts.
In the sequel we will argue that this model should be characterised by a probability distribution over a set of possible
valuations. This will then result in lower and upper (bipolar) measures of subjective belief on the sentences of L, as outlined
below. Now, in practice, there are many different sources of epistemic uncertainty that will inﬂuence an agent’s belief about
SL. However, here we suggest that one natural division of uncertainty types is as follows:
• Semantic uncertainty: This takes the form of uncertainty about the linguistic conventions governing the assertability of
sentences of L. In other words, uncertainty about what is the correct interpretation of L. For example, an agent may
be uncertain as to whether or not a proposition such as ‘Ethel is tall’ is deﬁnitely or acceptably assertable even if they
know Ethel’s height precisely. One would expect this type of uncertainty to be a natural consequence of the distributed
manner in which an agent learns language through communications with other individuals across a population of
interacting agents.
• Possible worlds uncertainty: This type of uncertainty arises from a lack of knowledge concerning the current state of
the world and in particular about the referents of sentences in L. For example, an agent may not know Ethel’s height
precisely and hence be uncertain about the truth-value of the proposition ‘Ethel is tall’. Another way of viewing this
is that the agent has identiﬁed a set of possible worlds, perhaps corresponding to different possible values for Ethel’s
height, but where he/she is uncertain as to which of these correspond to the actual world.
The second of these uncertainty types would seem to be consistent with the conventional understanding of epistemic
uncertainty. In contrast, the treatment of semantic uncertainty as a form of epistemic uncertainty perhaps requires some
justiﬁcation. In our view semantic uncertainty is another important aspect of vagueness in language, but one which is best
understood in terms of a lack of knowledge concerning the underlying conventions of the language. By adopting this view
we are, in effect, assuming that each agent believes in the existence of a coherent set of rules governing the assertability
of the sentences of L, which they should adhere to in order to communicate effectively with other agents. In other words,
agents make the assumption that there is a correct interpretation of the language L.7 This would seem to bring us close to
the epistemic theory of vagueness as expounded by Timothy Williamson [44]. The epistemic theory of vagueness assumes
that for the extension of a vague concept there is a precise but unknown dividing boundary between it and the extension
of its negation. For example, consider the set of heights which are classiﬁed as being tall, then according to the epistemic
theory there is a precise but unknown height threshold  for which all heights less than  are not tall and all those greater
than or equal to  are tall.
While there are marked similarities between the epistemic theory of vagueness and the notion of semantic uncertainty
outlined above, there are also some important differences. In the ﬁrst instance the epistemic view assumes that the under-
lying interpretation of the language is classical, while in the sequel we will assume that it may admit truth-gaps by, for
example, taking the form of a valuation pair. Perhaps more importantly though, the epistemic theory would seem to assume
the existence of some objectively correct interpretation of L which is not necessarily correlated with language use.8 Instead,
we adopt the more pragmatic view that individuals, when faced with decision problems about assertions, ﬁnd it useful as
part of decision making strategy to simply assume that there is a correct interpretation of L. In other words, when deciding
what can be asserted agents behave as if the epistemic theory is correct. In earlier work we have referred to this strategic
assumption across a population of agents as the epistemic stance [19], a concise statement of which is as follows:
Each individual agent in the population assumes the existence of a correct set of language conventions, governing what
can appropriately (or truthfully) be asserted given a particular state of the world.
7 Although there is no requirement that this should be a classical interpretation.
8 While this is true of the epistemic theory in general, it is perhaps worth noting that Williamson does assume that the correctness of one particular
interpretation is determined by the usage of speakers. Many thanks to one of the anonymous referees for this observation.
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in a single centralised form. Rather they are represented as a distributed body of knowledge concerning the interpretation
of concepts in various cases, shared across a population of agents, and emerging as the result of interactions and commu-
nications between individual agents all adopting the epistemic stance. The idea is that the learning processes of individual
agents, all sharing the fundamental aim of understanding how words can be appropriately used to communicate informa-
tion, will eventually converge to some degree on a set of shared conventions.9 The very process of convergence would then
to some extent vindicate the epistemic stance from the perspective of individual agents.
4.1. An integrated probabilistic uncertainty model
Here we propose an integrated treatment of both the types of epistemic uncertainty described above, but with the
additional assumption that interpretations of L may admit truth-gaps, i.e. that they correspond to valuation pairs. Let S
denote the different possible states of the world (or alternatively the set of possible worlds). A language convention c is
then viewed as a function which maps from states of the world to truth valuations on L. Hence, in the current context,
a language convention is a function c : S → V from states of the world to valuation pairs. Let C denote the set of such
conventions. Naturally, further restrictions of this deﬁnition may then be considered such as c : S → Vs or c : S → Vk
depending on the class of valuation pairs considered as providing the appropriate form of truth-model for L. For example, a
convention c could be associated with a particular pair of lower and upper thresholds    on height for the concept short.
Whereas a state of the world σ ∈ S would be associated with a particular height value h for Ethel. The proposition ‘Ethel
is short’ would then be absolutely true for those convention state pairs (c, σ ) for which h   and not necessarily false in
those for which h   . From this perspective, sentences of the language relate to the objective state of the world, but this
relationship is based on linguistic conventions which may be vague in the sense of admitting borderline cases. Hence the
truth (or falsity) of propositions depends on both the state of the world and the linguistic conventions according to which
the relevant concepts are deﬁned relative to the different possible states of the world S . A model of epistemic uncertainty
integrating both the uncertainty types can therefore be deﬁned in terms of a probability measure P on subsets of the cross
product space C ×S of linguistic conventions with world states. Such a model naturally generates a probability distribution
on valuation pairs given by:
w(v) = P({(c,σ ): c(σ ) = v})
From this we can naturally deﬁne lower and upper measures μ  μ¯ such that for θ ∈ SL, μ(θ) is the probability of a
valuation pair in which θ is absolutely true, while μ¯(θ) is the probability of a valuation pair in which θ is not absolutely
false. That is:
μ(θ) = w({v: v(θ) = 1}) and μ¯(θ) = w({v: v¯(θ) = 1})
This formulation would seem to have signiﬁcant overlap with that of Lassiter [18], who has proposed a model of linguistic
vagueness deﬁned on the cross-product space of possible worlds with possible languages. However, Lassiter’s approach only
refers to uncertainty about ‘precise languages’ suggesting that he is assuming a classical underlying truth-model. In this
respect, his work is strongly related to probabilistic interpretations of fuzzy sets (see [8] for an overview), in which a fuzzy
concept is deﬁned by a probability distribution on possible crisp set deﬁnitions. On the other hand, we argue that a bipolar
model combining epistemic uncertainty with truth-gaps provides extra ﬂexibility in decision making as well as helping to
explain why it may sometimes be optimal for an agent to choose to assert a vague statement rather than a semantically
similar crisp one. In Section 5 we will expand on this claim, however, initially we formally develop the notion of bipolar
belief pairs.
4.2. Belief pairs from probability distributions on valuation pairs
In this section we consider bipolar belief measures on SL as generated from probability distributions deﬁned on valua-
tion pairs. The motivation for this approach comes from the idea outlined in Section 4.1 that epistemic uncertainty has both
a semantic and stochastic element, naturally resulting in probability distributions on valuation pairs when these provide the
possible valuations of the language L. In particular, we will focus on Kleene and supervaluation pairs and investigate some
of the resulting bipolar uncertainty measures on SL and their properties.
Deﬁnition 27 (Supervaluation Belief Pair). Let w : Vs → [0,1] be a probability distribution on Vs (i.e. the set of all super-
valuation pairs on L) then the Supervaluation Belief Pair (SBP) generated by w is a pair of lower and upper measures
μs,w = (μs,w , μ¯s,w)10 deﬁned by: ∀θ ∈ SL
9 This kind of convergent process has been shown to take place in various agent-based simulations of language games. See, for example, Steels and
Belpaeme [37].
10 As with valuation pairs the notation μ = (μ, μ¯) refers to values of a lower and an upper belief measure and not an interval of possible values for a
single belief measure.
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({v ∈Vs: v(θ) = 1}) and μ¯s,w(θ) = w({v ∈Vs: v¯(θ) = 1})
We refer to SBPs where w is non-zero only on Vbs as Bounded Supervaluation Belief Pairs (BSBP) which are then
denoted by μbs,w = (μbs,w , μ¯bs,w). Similarly, BSBPs where w is non-zero only on Vcbs are referred to as Complete Bounded
Supervaluation Belief Pairs (CBSBP) and denoted by μcbs,w = (μcbs,w , μ¯cbs,w).
Notice that for SBPs we can deﬁne a mass function on sets of valuations m : 22P → [0,1] where m(∅) = 0 and∑
P⊆2P m(P) = 1 such that ∀v ∈Vs ,
m
({
Fα j : v¯(α j) = 1
})= w(v)
Notice that in this case:
μs,w(θ) =
∑
P⊆Pθ
m(P) and μ¯s,w(θ) =
∑
P∩Pθ =∅
m(P)
Hence, μs,w and μ¯s,w are Dempster–Shafer belief and plausibility measures on SL respectively [34]. Notice, in the case that
w : Vs → [0,1] is non-zero on {v1, . . . , vr} and where vi is generated by the set of admissible valuations Pi which can be
ordered such that Pi ⊇Pi+1 where i = 1, . . . , r − 1, then μs,w and μ¯s,w are necessity and possibility measures respectively
and hence: ∀θ,ϕ ∈ SL,
μs,w(θ ∧ ϕ) =min
(
μs,w(θ),μs,w(ϕ)
)
and μ¯s,w(θ ∨ ϕ) =max
(
μs,w(θ), μ¯s,w(ϕ)
)
Notice from Theorem 15 that μs,w and μ¯s,w are necessity and possibility measures exactly when w is non-zero only on a
set of supervaluation pairs which can be totally ordered according to the semantic precision relation. In effect, in this case
the agent’s uncertainty is restricted to a lack of knowledge about exactly how semantically precise the correct interpretation
of L should be.
We now deﬁne belief pairs for the case when the underlying truth-model is that of Kleene valuation pairs.
Deﬁnition 28 (Kleene Belief Pair). Let w : Vk → [0,1] be a probability distribution on Vk (i.e. the set of all Kleene valuation
pairs on L) then the Kleene Belief Pair (KBP) generated by w is a pair of lower and upper measures μk,w = (μk,w , μ¯k,w)
deﬁned by: ∀θ ∈ SL
μk,w(θ) = w
({v ∈Vk: v(θ) = 1}) and μ¯k,w(θ) = w({v ∈Vk: v¯(θ) = 1})
Unsurprisingly, the properties of belief pairs are fundamentally constrained by the properties of the underlying valuation
pairs. For example, it follows immediately that belief pairs which are deﬁned in terms of valuation pairs satisfying VP1,
including both SBP and KBP, also satisfy duality in that ∀θ ∈ SL, μ(¬θ) = 1 − μ¯(θ), and vice-versa. In the sequel we will
investigate the properties of supervaluation belief pairs and Kleene belief pairs in the light of the results given in Section 3.2
relating Kleene and bounded supervaluation pairs in the context of the semantic precision relation. Initially, however, we
propose an operational justiﬁcation for the deﬁnition of belief pairs in terms of probability distributions on valuation pairs
by introducing an extension of de Finetti’s betting semantics for subjective probability.
4.3. Betting semantics for belief pairs
Inspired by the operationalism movement in physics de Finetti [4] proposed betting behaviour as an operational seman-
tics for subjective probability. In this section we employ a generalisation of de Finetti’s result due to Paris [28] in order to
give a betting interpretation of belief pairs as deﬁned in Section 4.2. This will require a short initial digression in order to
outline de Finetti’s basic idea.
The motivation behind de Finetti’s approach was to provide a mechanism for eliciting a number in [0,1] quantifying an
agent’s belief in a sentence θ by requiring them to decide whether or not to accept a series of bets involving θ . It can then
be shown that in order for the agent to avoid situations of sure loss, referred to as Dutch books, an agent’s quantitative
beliefs must then conform to the axioms of probability theory. More formally, we can identify a bet by triple (s,α, θ) where
θ ∈ SL is the statement on which we are betting, s ∈R is the stake which can be either positive or negative, and α ∈ [0,1]
is the odds. Accepting or buying this bet then means agreeing to the following terms:
• pay s × α,
• for which you will receive £s if θ is true and receive £0 if θ is false.
Note that if s < 0 you are effectively selling the bet instead of buying it. Now supposing that the classical valuation v ∈Vc is
representative of the true state of the world combined with the correct language convention then the gain from bet (s,α, θ)
is s(v(θ) − α). Consequently, if language conventions are such that only classical valuation occur for any state of the world
then a Dutch book can be deﬁned as a set of bets (si,αi, θi): i = 1, . . . ,m such that ∀v ∈Vc , ∑mi=1 si(v(θi) − αi) < 0.
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agent’s quantitative beliefs about the sentences of L. Suppose μ is determined so that for all sentences θ , μ(θ) is the
value for which the agent will accept the bet (s,μ(θ), θ) for any stake s ∈ R, i.e. μ(θ) represents the odds for which the
agent will bet on θ no matter what the value of the stake. In this case an agent will accept any set of bets of the form
(si,μ(θi), θi): i = 1, . . . ,m and consequently it is desirable that no such sequence should be a Dutch book. Hence, a rational
agent is one for whom their belief function μ is deﬁned in such a way that no set of sentences of this form is a Dutch
book. de Finetti’s famous theorem shows that, according to this deﬁnition, an agent is rational if and only if their belief is a
probability measure on SL.
Now the above argument assumes that the underlying truth-model is classical. We now consider the consequences of
allowing truth-gaps by assuming that the set of possible truth-models is a ﬁnite set of valuation pairs V′ ⊆V which satisfy
the duality principle VP1. In this case it is natural to deﬁne both lower and upper bets where the lower bet is dependent
on the sentence involved being absolutely true while the upper bet requires only that it is not absolutely false. Hence, let
(s,α, θ)∗ denote the lower bet:
• pay s × α
• receive £s if θ is absolutely true and receive £0 if θ is not absolutely true
while (s,α, θ)∗ denotes the upper bet:
• pay s × α
• receive £s if θ is not absolutely false and receive £0 if θ is absolutely false
If v ∈ V′ is the valuation pair representing the true state of the world combined with the correct language interpretation
then the gain from (s,α, θ)∗ is s(v(θ) − α) while that of (s,α, θ)∗ is s(v¯(θ) − α). An obvious consequence of this is that
if s  0 then the gain from (s,α, θ)∗ is always greater than or equal to that of (s,α, θ)∗ while if s < 0 then the situation
is reversed. Consequently a rational agent should always prefer to buy upper bets and sell lower bets whenever possible.
Furthermore, the duality property VP1 implies a strong relationship between lower and upper bets as follows: Notice, that
the gain for lower bet (s,α,¬θ)∗ is s(v(¬θ) − α) = s(1− v¯(θ) − α) = −s(v¯(θ) − (1− α)) which is the same as the gain for
the upper bet (−s,1 − α, θ)∗ . Consequently, these two bets should be viewed as equivalent since a rational agent should
be willing to accept (s,α,¬θ)∗ if and only if they are also willing to accept (−s,1− α, θ)∗ . In other words, for any stake a
rational agent should be equally willing to buy a lower bet on θ at a given odds and sell an upper bet on ¬θ at one minus
those odds, and vice-versa.
We now adopt an operational model in which an agent’s beliefs are quantiﬁed by a belief pair μ where for any sentence
θ , μ(θ) corresponds to the odds at which the agent is prepared to accept the lower bet (s,α, θ)∗ for any stake s ∈R, while
μ¯(θ) is the odds at which the agent will accept the upper bet (s,α, θ)∗ for any stake s ∈ R. Notice immediately from the
above duality argument that the two bets (s,μ(¬θ),¬θ)∗ and (−s,1− μ(¬θ), θ)∗ are equally acceptable for any s ∈R and
hence μ¯(θ) = 1− μ(¬θ).
Now in this extended context a Dutch book is a combined set of lower and upper bets (si,αi, θi)∗: i = 1, . . . , r and
(s j,α j, θ j)∗: j = r + 1, . . . ,m for m r such that ∀v ∈V′ ,
r∑
i=1
si
(
v(θi) − αi
)+
m∑
j=r+1
s j
(
v¯(θ j) − α j
)
< 0
However, from the duality relationship described above we can restrict our attention to Dutch books involving only lower
bets since the set (si,αi, θi)∗: i = 1, . . . , r and (s j,α j, θ j)∗: j = r + 1, . . . ,m is a Dutch book if and only if the set
(si,αi, θi)∗: i = 1, . . . , r and (−s j,1− α j,¬θ j)∗: j = r + 1, . . . ,m is a Dutch book.
Theorem 29. An agent is rational (in the sense of avoiding Dutch books comprised of lower and upper bets) if and only if ∀θ ∈ SL,
μ(θ) = w({v ∈V′: v(θ) = 1}) and μ¯(θ) = w({v ∈V′: v¯(θ) = 1})
where w is a probability distribution on V′ .
Proof. Paris [28] proved the following: Let B be a ﬁnite set of binary functions on SL. Here we are assuming that B is the
set of possible truth-models for L, so that if b ∈ B is the true valuation then the gain from the bet (s,α, θ) is s(b(θ) − α).
Also, let μ : SL→ [0,1] denote the odds for which the bet (s,α, θ) is acceptable for all s ∈ R. Then there is no set of bets
(si,b(θi), θi): i = 1, . . . ,m for which ∀b ∈ B,
m∑
si
(
b(θi) − μ(θi)
)
< 0i=1
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probability distribution on B.
Now from the above we know that a belief pair μ avoids Dutch books involving lower and upper bets if and only if
the lower measure μ avoids Dutch books comprised only of lower bets. Hence, the result follows immediately from Paris’
theorem by taking B= {v: v ∈V′} and from the duality between μ and μ¯. 
Clearly then Theorem 29 provides an added justiﬁcation for Deﬁnitions 27 and 28 by taking V′ = Vs and V′ = Vk
respectively. That is, if the underlying truth-models of L are supervaluation pairs or Kleene valuation pairs, then a rational
agent should respectively adopt supervaluation belief pairs or Kleene belief pairs as their subjective belief model in order
to avoid Dutch books comprised of sets of lower and upper bets.
4.4. Belief pairs and semantic precision
We now investigate the properties of belief pairs relative to the semantic precision partial ordering on valuation pairs.
The aim is to highlight certain classes of belief pairs which provide computationally eﬃcient models under particularly
restricted uncertainty conditions. We begin by extending Theorem 21 so as to show a natural relationship between bounded
supervaluation belief pairs and Kleene belief pairs.
Theorem 30. For any BSBP μbs,w there is a KBP μk,w ′ such that ∀θ ∈ SL+ ∪ SL− , μbs,w(θ) = μk,w ′ (θ) and ∀θ ∈ SL, μk,w ′ (θ)
μbs,w(θ) and μ¯k,w ′(θ) μ¯bs,w(θ).
Proof. By Theorem 21 there exists a function g :Vbs →Vk such that g(vbs) = vk where vk(pi) = 1 iff pi ∈ F and v¯k(pi) = 1
iff pi ∈ F for F ⊆ F the lower and upper admissible valuations of vbs and where ∀θ ∈ SL+ ∪ SL− , and ∀v ∈Vbs , v and g(v)
agree on θ .
Now given BSBP μbs,w generated by probability distribution w on Vbs we deﬁne the distribution w ′ on Vk as follows
w ′
(v ′)= w({v ∈Vbs: g(v) = v ′})
Then ∀θ ∈ SL+ ∪ SL− we have that:
μbs,w(θ) = w
({v ∈Vbs: v(θ) = 1})= w({v ∈Vbs: g(v) = v ′ and v ′(θ) = 1})
= w ′({v ′ ∈Vk: v ′(θ) = 1})= μk,w ′(θ)
The result follows similarly for μ¯bs,w(θ).
Furthermore, from Theorem 21 we have that if g(v) = v ′ then v ′  v . Hence,
μk,w ′(θ) = w ′
({v ′ ∈Vk: v ′(θ) = 1})= w({v ∈Vbs: g(v) = v ′, v ′(θ) = 1})
 w
({v ∈Vbs: v(θ) = 1})= μbs,w(θ)
The proof that μ¯k,w ′ (θ) μ¯bs,w(θ) follows similarly. 
For BSBP the following result identiﬁes nestedness constraints on the set of valuation pairs with non-zero probability,
resulting in a belief pair which is truth-functional on SL+ and SL− .
Theorem 31. Let μbs,w be a BSBP where w is non-zero on the set of bounded supervaluation pairs {v1, . . . , vr} such that for vi and
v j where i = j either Fi ⊆ F j or F j ⊆ F i and either F i ⊆ F j or F j ⊆ F i . In this case: ∀θ,ϕ ∈ SL+ and ∀θ,ϕ ∈ SL− ,
μbs,w(θ ∧ ϕ) =min
(
μbs,w(θ),μbs,w(ϕ)
)
and μ¯bs,w(θ ∧ ϕ) =min
(
μ¯bs,w(θ), μ¯bs,w(ϕ)
)
μbs,w(θ ∨ ϕ) =max
(
μbs,w(θ),μbs,w(ϕ)
)
and μ¯bs,w(θ ∨ ϕ) =max
(
μ¯bs,w(θ), μ¯bs,w(ϕ)
)
Proof. Here we only prove the result for sentences in SL+ . The result follows similarly for sentences in SL− . Given the
conditions of the theorem we can assume w.l.o.g. that the set of bounded supervaluation pairs {v1, . . . , vr} are ordered such
that F 1 ⊆ · · · ⊆ F r . Now by Lemma 16 it holds that ∀θ ∈ SL+ , vi(θ) = 1 if and only if v F i (θ) = 1. Also, by Lemma 16 it
follows that if v F i (θ) = 1 then v F j (θ) = 1 for j = i + 1, . . . , r. Hence, ∃t  r such that:{vi: vi(θ) = 1}= {vt, . . . , vr}
Similarly, for ϕ ∈ SL+ , ∃t′  r such that
{vi: vi(ϕ) = 1}= {vt′ , . . . , vr}
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{vi: vi(θ ∧ ϕ) = 1}= {vmax(t,t′), . . . , vr}
Consequently,
μbs,w(θ) =
r∑
j=t
w(v j), μbs,w(ϕ) =
r∑
j=t′
w(v j) and
μbs,w(θ ∧ ϕ) =
r∑
j=max(t,t′)
w(v j) =min
(
μbs,w(θ),μbs,w(ϕ)
)
Also, by Theorem 20 it follows that vi(θ ∨ ϕ) =max(vi(θ), vi(ϕ)) and hence,
μbs,w(θ ∨ ϕ) =
r∑
j=min(t,t′)
w(v j) =max
(
μbs,w(θ),μbs,w(ϕ)
)
The required results for μ¯bs,w can be proved in a similar manner since we can reorder the relevant valuation pairs so that
{v1, . . . , vr} = {v ′1, . . . , v ′r} where F ′1 ⊆ · · · ⊆ F ′r . 
Corollary 32. Let μbs,w be a BSBP for which {v ∈ Vbs: w(v) > 0} = {v1, . . . , vr} can be ordered such that v1  v2  · · · vr then
the following holds:
∀θ, ϕ ∈ SL, μbs,w(θ ∧ ϕ) =min
(
μbs,w(θ),μbs,w(ϕ)
)
and μ¯bs,w(θ ∨ ϕ) =max
(
μ¯bs,w(θ), μ¯bs,w(ϕ)
)
and
∀θ, ϕ ∈ SL+ and ∀θ, ϕ ∈ SL−, μbs,w(θ ∨ ϕ) =max
(
μbs,w(θ),μbs,w(ϕ)
)
and
μ¯bs,w(θ ∧ ϕ) =min
(
μ¯bs,w(θ), μ¯bs,w(ϕ)
)
Proof. Since v1  · · · vr it follows from Theorem 15 that P1 ⊇ · · · ⊇Pr . Hence μbs,w and μ¯bs,w are necessity and possi-
bility measures on SL respectively. Also, it trivially holds that F i ⊆ F i+1 and F i ⊇ F i+1 for i = 1, . . . , r − 1. The result then
follows immediately from Theorem 31. 
Corollary 32 identiﬁes a special case of the conditions of Theorem 31 for BSBPs generated from a probability distribution
which is non-zero only on a set of valuation pairs that can be totally ordered by the semantic precision relation. Recall from
Section 4.2 that in this case a SBP corresponds to a necessity and possibility measure on SL. Combined with Theorem 31
this results in uncertainty measures that are partially functional in general, and fully truth-functional on SL+ and SL− .
Corollary 32 has close parallels with a related result for KBP originally given in [23] as follows:
Theorem 33. Let μk,w be a KBP for which {v ∈ Vk: w(v) > 0} = {v1, . . . , vr} can be ordered such that v1  v2  · · · vr . In this
case: ∀θ,ϕ ∈ SL
μk,w(θ ∧ ϕ) =min
(
μk,w(θ),μk,w(ϕ)
)
and μ¯k,w(θ ∧ ϕ) =min
(
μ¯k,w(θ), μ¯k,w(ϕ)
)
μk,w(θ ∨ ϕ) =max
(
μk,w(θ),μk,w(ϕ)
)
and μ¯k,w(θ ∨ ϕ) =max
(
μ¯k,w(θ), μ¯k,w(ϕ)
)
Theorem 33 is an even stronger result that Corollary 32 in that for KBPs, if an agent’s uncertainty concerns only the
semantic precision of the correct interpretation of L, then the resulting belief pair is fully truth-functional. Indeed, in
such a case KBPs satisfy the deﬁnition of lower and upper truth-values (membership values) in interval fuzzy logic (set
theory) as proposed independently by Zadeh [43], Grattan-Guiness [13], Jahn [15] and Sambuc [33]. Furthermore, given the
isomorphic relationship between interval fuzzy logic and Atanassov’s intuitionistic fuzzy logic [1], Theorem 33 also allows
for an interpretation of the latter in terms of KBPs. More speciﬁcally, we can interpret intuitionistic fuzzy truth and falsity
degrees in a sentence θ as corresponding to the probability that θ is absolutely true and the probability that θ is absolutely
false respectively, based on an underlying truth-model of Kleene valuation pairs about which the only uncertainty relates
to semantic precision. In this case we can think of these measures as analogous to necessity and possibility measures, but
where the truth-model is that of Kleene rather than supervaluation pairs.
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A fundamental challenge in natural language communications is to understand why we often choose to make vague
assertions when we have many potentially suitable crisp (semantically precise) alternatives at our disposal. If the aim
were simply to convey information then we might suppose that the use of vague statements would only result in reduced
eﬃciency. Indeed some formal results in the game theoretic literature seem to support this view [25]. However, van Deemter
[39,40] identiﬁes a number of plausible reasons for the utility of vagueness in natural language. In [39] a decision theoretic
approach is proposed according to which different utterances have different rewards or costs (negative rewards), and where
the choice of assertion in a particular context is driven by utility. Such an approach has similarities with the assertability risk
models of Giles [11] and Kyburg [17]. In this section we outline a very preliminary application of belief pairs to assertion
decisions, focusing on a class of communication scenarios referred to by van Deemter [39] as future contingencies. Here
we consider a communications model in which different agents have different, and to some degree conﬂicting, goals and
objectives. An agent is then required to make a statement, perhaps in the form of a prediction or commitment, about some
future state of the world. While there are potential rewards for making such statements, there may also be the risk of
signiﬁcant costs if they prove to be incorrect or if promises are seen to be broken. In such scenarios, van Deemter argues,
the utility of making a vague assertion may be potentially higher than that for making a crisp assertion, primarily because
the risk of incurring costs is signiﬁcantly reduced. Future contingency scenarios are important in many AI applications
involving natural language generation (see [31] for an overview) such as automatic weather forecast generation [12] or in
automatic medical diagnosis systems [29].
To illustrate the type of problems involved consider the example of a politician who is considering making a pledge at an
upcoming British General Election. She would like to promise as high a reduction in the budget deﬁcit as possible (achieved
by cutting public expenditure) resulting in as small an increase as possible in unemployment. She judges that a promise
of this kind would be popular with voters and would increase the probability of her (or her political party) winning the
election. One possibility would be to decide on a crisp assertion and promise say ‘at least a 40% reduction in the deﬁcit
and no more than a 2% increase in unemployment’. However, she may then be worried that she will ﬁnd it diﬃcult to
meet this commitment exactly and subsequently be punished by the voters at the following election in ﬁve years time. If
on the other hand she promises ‘a signiﬁcant reduction in the debt with only a minor increase in unemployment’ then she
may still be able to curry favour with the voters at the current general election while reducing the risk of being accused of
breaking promises at the subsequent election. To quote van Deemter [39] ‘a precise promise is easier to break than a vague
one’. The notion of valuation pairs and truth-gaps may provide some insight into why this is indeed the case. The voters
in our example may interpret the politician as promising that their assertion will be absolutely true by some future date,
perhaps by the subsequent election, and reward them accordingly. However, they will not then signiﬁcantly punish them
unless the assertion turns out to be absolutely false. Hence, in future contingency scenarios the truth-gap associated with a
vague assertion provides the agent with a window of opportunity in which they can maximise their chance of reward and
minimise their risk of loss. Furthermore, in practice almost all assertion decisions of this kind will be made in the presence
of signiﬁcant epistemic uncertainty. Consequently, by combining a model of truth-gaps with that of epistemic uncertainty,
bipolar belief pairs may well provide a useful framework for the analysis of future contingency and similar assertion deci-
sion scenarios. Indeed, for the above example there is a clear need for an integrated model of this kind. Since phrases such
as ‘signiﬁcant reduction’ and ‘minor increase’ are vague we would certainly expect linguistic conventions to be based around
truth-models which explicitly represent borderline cases. For example, the truth valuation of the statement that there will
be only ‘a minor increase in unemployment’ might be determined by lower and upper thresholds on the overall percentage
increase in unemployment, along the lines described in Section 4.1 for the concept short. In addition, the inherent semantic
uncertainty associated with the interpretation of such natural language descriptions would mean that the politician will be
uncertain as to the exact nature of the language convention which should be applied in this case. This semantic uncertainty
could then manifest itself as uncertainty regarding the values of the relevant lower and upper thresholds for phrases such
as ‘minor increase in unemployment’. Furthermore, since the politician is making a prediction about the future, she will be
uncertain as to what will be the actual state of the world. For example, she will be unsure about what will be the actual
percentage changes to unemployment and to the deﬁcit. The bipolar model outlined in Section 4 would then allow the
politician to capture all these different aspects inﬂuencing the likely truth or falsity of their predictions by lower and upper
belief measures on the sentences concerned.
We now propose a simple utility decision model based on bipolar belief measures in order to explore the potential
advantages of asserting a vague sentence over a crisp one. Suppose that, at time t0, an agent must choose between assertions
θ and ϕ concerning the state of the world at some future time t1, where ϕ is crisp and θ is vague. Assume that the reward
for making either assertion at time t0 is x > 0. At time t1 there will be a further reward y > 0 if the assertion made at
t0 is judged to be absolutely true given the actual state of the world at t1. Similarly, there will be a cost −z (z > 0) if
the assertion made is judged to be absolutely false given the state of the world at t1. Furthermore, in the case of vague
assertion θ , there will be a small cost −w (0 w  z) if θ is judged to be a borderline statement at t1.
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μ.11 Let Uθ and Uϕ denote the total rewards (which may be negative) for making assertions θ and ϕ respectively. Then
based on μ, the agent can evaluate their expected reward for making either assertion θ or ϕ at time t0 as follows:
E(Uθ ) = x+ μ(θ)y − μ(¬θ)z −
(
μ¯(θ) − μ(θ))w = x− z + μ(θ)(y + w) + μ¯(θ)(z − w)
E(Uϕ) = x+ μ(ϕ)y − μ(¬ϕ)z = x− z + μ(ϕ)(y + z)
where, since ϕ is a crisp statement, μ(ϕ) = μ¯(ϕ) = μ(ϕ). Given this formulation we can now investigate under what
circumstances the agent would expect a higher reward for asserting the vague statement θ than for asserting the precise
statement ϕ . Initially, we make the simplifying assumption that θ being a borderline case is effectively cost neutral so that
w = 0. Furthermore, we assume that θ is selected such that μ(θ) < μ(ϕ) < μ¯(θ).12 Now let α = yz be the ratio of the
reward for the assertion being absolutely true at t1 against the cost of the assertion be absolutely false at t1. Then we have
that:
E(Uθ ) E(Uϕ) if and only if α 
μ¯(θ) − μ(ϕ)
μ(ϕ) − μ(θ)
Hence, we have an upper bound on the ratio of reward y over cost z for which E(Uθ ) E(Uϕ), so that the higher the cost
of making an assertion which is absolutely false at t1 relative to the reward of making an assertion which is absolutely
true at t1, the more likely it is that the agent will be better off choosing a vague over a crisp assertion. In addition, as
the belief value of ϕ approaches to the lower belief value for θ then there is an increasing range of ratio values for which
the agent will be better off choosing the vague over the crisp assertion. Furthermore, notice that if μ(ϕ) μ(θ)+μ¯(θ)2 then
E(Uθ )  E(Uϕ) for all α ∈ [0,1] (i.e. for all cases where y  z). A particular instance of this is when μ(θ) = (0,1) and
μ(ϕ)  0.5 and hence, if the cost of making an assertion which is absolutely false at t1 is higher than the reward for
making an assertion which is absolutely true at t1, then a rational agent should choose a statement which they are certain
is borderline over a crisp statement for which their belief value is at most 0.5.
These result must, of course, be understood in the light of the modelling assumption we have made. In particular, we
have assumed that there are the same rewards and costs, x, y and z, for both crisp and vague assertions. We might perhaps
justify this assumption by supposing that the two assertions are suﬃciently semantically similar that there would be no
distinction made between them in the allocation of rewards and costs. However, it is equally possible that other agents may
prefer crisp assertions over vague ones. For example, voters may be more likely to vote for a politician who makes crisp
promises because such assertions are easier to evaluate at a future date than similar but vague commitments. One way of
modelling this would be to suppose different rewards x1 and x2 for asserting θ and ϕ at t0 respectively, and where x2  x1.
In this case the expected utilities from asserting θ and ϕ are given by:
E(Uθ ) = x1 − z + μ(θ)(y + w) + μ¯(θ)(z − w) and E(Uϕ) = x2 − z + μ(ϕ)(y + z)
From this we obtain that E(Uθ ) E(Uϕ) if and only if α  μ¯(θ)−μ(ϕ)−βμ(ϕ)−μ(θ) and β  μ¯(θ) − μ(ϕ) where β = x2−x1z is the ratio
of the difference between the two rewards at t0 over the cost at t1 of making an absolutely false assertion. Consequently,
the larger the cost of making an absolutely false assertion relative to the different rewards x1, x2 and y, the more likely it
is that the agent will be better off making a vague rather than a crisp assertion.
The above is of course a highly simpliﬁed analysis with many assumptions which are probably unrealistic. Despite these
limitations we nonetheless suggest that it does take some small steps towards demonstrating the potential applicability of
the bipolar belief framework for modelling decision problems involving the choice of vague over crisp assertions. A decision
theoretic analysis of this kind could have signiﬁcant applications in Artiﬁcial Intelligence. Indeed, some natural language
generation systems already include the use of vague words. For example, the weather forecasting system FOG developed
by Goldberg et al. [12] includes terms such as westerly or southerly to describe wind direction. A more developed analysis
along the lines of that outline above, raises the possibility of providing such systems with the capability of choosing between
vague and crisp assertions on the basis of a range of factors including context and uncertainty levels.
6. Conclusions
In this paper we have introduced valuation pairs as a truth-model which captures borderline cases relating to vague
propositional statements. Different classes of valuation pairs have been discussed and the relationships between them have
been investigated. In particular, we have provided axiomatic characterisations of supervaluation pairs and Kleene valuation
11 For this analysis it is not important whether μ is an SBP or a KBP.
12 A justiﬁcation of this assumption is as follows: Suppose that θ is selected by the agent so that it is a less semantically precise statement than ϕ . Then
in the framework of valuation pairs this would mean the following: If μ is generated by probability distribution w where {v: w(v) > 0} = {v1, . . . , vr}
then since ϕ is crisp vi(ϕ) = v¯ i(ϕ) = vi(ϕ) for i = 1, . . . , r and since θ is less semantically precise than ϕ then vi(θ) vi(ϕ) v¯ i(θ) for i = 1, . . . , r,
where in some cases these inequalities are strict. From this it follows immediately that μ(θ) < μ(θ) < μ¯(θ).
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pairs.
We have then proposed an integrated approach to truth-gaps and epistemic uncertainty in the form of lower and upper
belief measures on the sentences of the language. In this context the lower measure of a sentence θ is the probability
that θ is absolutely true, while the upper measure is the probability that θ is not absolutely false. The deﬁnition of these
two measures in terms of an underlying probability distribution on valuation pairs can be justiﬁed by assuming that the
truth-model for the language is functionally dependent on both the state of the world and conventions for language use,
and where epistemic uncertainty is modelled by a probability distribution on world state and language convention pairs.
Further justiﬁcation is provided by a betting argument according to which a rational agent must deﬁne their lower and
upper measures so as avoid accepting Dutch books consisting of sets of lower and upper bets. Within this bipolar belief
framework we have outlined a possible decision theoretic argument as to why, in some circumstances, it might be optimal
for an agent to choose to assert a vague statement over a crisp one when making forecasts or promises relating to some
future state of the world about which they are uncertain.
The model of truth-gaps provided by valuation pairs assumes that the notions of absolutely true and absolutely false
are primitives and consequently our framework lacks some the expressiveness of other approaches especially with regard
to higher order vagueness. For example, many formalisations of supervaluationism are based on modal logic (e.g. Bennett
[2]) and which therefore allow the explicit representation of higher order statements such as ‘absolutely true θ ’ and ‘bor-
derline true that absolutely true θ ’ etc. Indeed, the importance of capturing higher-order borderline cases in this manner is
largely taken for granted by theorists of vagueness. However, we argue that there are a number of justiﬁcations for a more
straightforward approach which avoids representing higher-order statements as part of the language.
From a practical perspective the valuation pair framework is suﬃciently general to encompass a range of different theo-
retical approaches to truth-gaps. This enables direct comparisons between, for instance, supervaluationism and three-valued
logic of the kind we have outlined in this paper. Furthermore, the valuation pair approach can be naturally extended so as
to provide an integrated model of truth-gaps and epistemic uncertainty based on lower and upper measures as described in
Section 4. From a more theoretical perspective we argue that the idea of higher-order truth-gaps is actually quite problem-
atic and that it is far from clear that valuations of the form borderline true that absolutely true are even meaningful. Consider,
for example, the concept of short as deﬁned on the scale of heights. Suppose that instead of the two threshold values  and
 suggested in Section 4.1, we have a series of increasing thresholds representing borderline cases, borderline borderline
cases and so on. The problem with this interpretation of the concept is that, as pointed out by Sainsbury [32], it naturally
collapses to the original two-borderline case. This is because, given the original intuition behind borderline cases as being
those which are neither absolutely true nor absolutely false, we must be able to partition the set of heights as follows:
There is a set of lower heights to which the concept short is absolutely and totally applicable. Similarly, there is an upper
set of heights to which short is absolutely and totally not applicable. The union of all other sets of heights, no matter what
level of borderline they constitute, can simply be viewed as a type of borderline i.e. heights which for which short is neither
absolutely applicable nor absolutely not applicable. Another perspective on this is given by Raffman [30] who suggests that
second order statement such as ‘absolutely true θ ’ and ‘absolutely false θ ’ simply do not admit truth-gaps. In other words,
such statements admit only a binary truth-model. Indeed, Raffman argues, that given our intuitive understanding of ‘abso-
lutely true θ ’ and ‘absolutely false θ ’ as meaning that θ is unquestionably true or unquestionably false respectively, then
a statement such as ‘borderline absolutely true θ ’ can have no other truth-value but false. Of course, none of this means
that an agent may not be uncertain as to the exact boundaries of a concept. However, we would argue that this is a form
of semantic uncertainty about the conventions of language use and consequently should be modelled probabilistically as
described in Section 4, rather than being incorporated into the underlying truth-model by means of modal operators.
It is certainly the case that a purely propositional framework, as described in this paper, has deﬁnite limitations. Future
work should therefore explore extending these ideas to predicate logic. One initial approach might be to develop random set
and prototype theory models of the kind introduced in [20], so as to incorporate both lower and upper threshold distances
from prototypes. The idea here is that the interpretation of a predicate R would be deﬁned by a set of prototypes P R in
some underlying metric space, together with lower and upper thresholds,  and  , on the distance of elements from P R .
For an element of the space x with distance less than  from P R , R(x) would be absolutely true, while for an element x
with distance from P R greater than  , R(x) would be absolutely false. All other elements would then be borderline cases
of R . Semantic uncertainty about the exact values of  and  could then be modelled by a joint probability distribution on
the two thresholds. An elementary model of this kind has already been proposed in [21] and in [38], but there is scope to
develop a much more general version of this prototype theory based framework to capture borderline cases and semantic
uncertainty in predicate deﬁnitions.
As we have already indicated in Section 5 the bipolar framework outlined in this paper has potential application to nat-
ural language generation systems. Other areas of Artiﬁcial Intelligence where our approach may have applications include
consensus modelling and multi-agent dialogues. For the former, truth-gaps may provide a means by which an agent can
adapt their beliefs so as to reach consensus with other agents whilst maintaining a certain level of internal consistency.
Indeed truth-gaps are fundamental here, in allowing for a weaker notion of consistency according to which different valua-
tions may still be considered consistent. Furthermore, consensus modelling provides an example of an application in which
the interests of different agents are more or less aligned. More speciﬁcally, agents share a common goal of, where possible,
reaching a consensus about their beliefs. In multi-agent dialogues, lower and upper valuations can provide a model of strong
J. Lawry, Y. Tang / Artiﬁcial Intelligence 191–192 (2012) 20–41 41and weak assertions, with semantic precision providing a structured criterion according to which different viewpoints can
be clustered together. Preliminary studies have been carried out in both application areas for Kleene valuation pairs (see
[24] and [22]). There are plans to extend these to more in depth studies, including developing the proposed methods within
the general valuation pairs framework.
Acknowledgements
The authors would like to thank the anonymous referees for their insightful comments and suggestions. Yongchuan Tang
is funded by the National Basic Research Program of China (973 Program) under Grant No. 2012CB316400, and the National
Natural Science Foundation of China (NSFC) under Grant No. 61075046.
References
[1] K. Atanassov, Intuitionistic fuzzy sets, Fuzzy Sets and Systems 20 (1986) 87–96.
[2] B. Bennett, Modal semantics for knowledge bases dealing with vague concepts, in: A.G. Cohn, L. Schubert, S. Shapiro (Eds.), Principles of Knowledge
Representation and Reasoning: Proceedings in KR-98, Morgan Kaufmann, 1998, pp. 234–244.
[3] G. de Cooman, Towards a possibilistic logic, in: D. Ruan (Ed.), Fuzzy Set Theory and Advanced Mathematical Applications, Springer, 1995, pp. 89–133.
[4] B. de Finetti, Sul signiﬁcato soggettivo della probabilità, Fundamenta Mathematicae 17 (1931) 298–329.
[5] D. Dubois, H. Prade, Gradualness, uncertainty and bipolarity: Making sense of Fuzzy Sets, Fuzzy Sets and Systems 192 (1) (2012) 3–24.
[6] D. Dubois, On ignorance and contradiction considered as truth-values, Logic Journal of the IGPL 16 (2) (2008) 195–216.
[7] D. Dubois, H. Prade, An introduction to bipolar representations of information and preference, International Journal of Intelligent Systems 23 (2008)
866–877.
[8] D. Dubois, H. Prade, The three semantics of fuzzy sets, Fuzzy Sets and Systems 90 (1997) 141–150.
[9] D. Dubois, H. Prade, Possibility theory, probability theory and multiple-valued logics: A clariﬁcation, Annals of Mathematics and Artiﬁcial Intelligence 32
(2001) 35–66.
[10] K. Fine, Vagueness, truth and logic, Synthese 30 (1975) 265–300.
[11] R. Giles, The concept of grade of membership, Fuzzy Sets and Systems 25 (1988) 297–323.
[12] E. Goldberg, N. Driedger, R.I. Kittredge, Using natural-language processing to produce weather forecasts, IEEE Expert: Intelligent Systems and Their
Applications 9 (2) (1994) 45–53.
[13] I. Grattan-Guiness, Fuzzy membership mapped onto interval and many-valued quantities, Zeitschrift für Mathematische Logik und Grundlagen der
Mathematik 22 (1975) 149–160.
[14] D. Hyde, From heaps and gaps to heaps of gluts, Mind 106 (1997) 641–660.
[15] K.U. Jahn, Intervall-wertige Mengen, Mathematische Nachrichten 68 (1975) 115–132.
[16] S.C. Kleene, Introduction to Metamathematics, D. Van Nostrand Company Inc., Princeton, New Jersey, 1952.
[17] A. Kyburg, When vague sentences inform: A model of assertability, Synthese 124 (2000) 175–192.
[18] D. Lassiter, Vagueness as probabilistic linguistic knowledge, Lecture Notes in Artiﬁcial Intelligence 6517 (2011) 127–150.
[19] J. Lawry, Appropriateness measures: An uncertainty model for vague concepts, Synthese 161 (2) (2008) 255–269.
[20] J. Lawry, Y. Tang, Uncertainty modelling for vague concepts: A prototype theory approach, Artiﬁcial Intelligence 173 (2009) 1539–1558.
[21] J. Lawry, A random set and prototype theory interpretation on intuitionistic fuzzy sets, in: E. Hüllermeier, R. Kruse, F. Hoffman (Eds.), Information
Processing and Management of Uncertainty in Knowledge-Based Systems: Theory and Methods, Springer, 2010, pp. 618–628.
[22] J. Lawry, Imprecise bipolar belief measures based on partial knowledge from agent dialogues, Lecture Notes in Computer Science 6379 (2010) 205–218.
[23] J. Lawry, I. Gonzalez-Rodriguez, A bipolar model of assertability and belief, International Journal of Approximate Reasoning 52 (2011) 76–91.
[24] J. Lawry, D. Dubois, A bipolar framework for combining beliefs about vague propositions, in: Proceedings of 13th International Conference on Principles
of Knowledge Representation and Reasoning, 2012, pp. 530–540.
[25] B.L. Lipman, Why is language vague? Working paper, Department of Economics, Boston University, 2006.
[26] J. Lukasiewicz, O logice trojwartosciowej (On three-valued logic), Ruch Filozoﬁczny 5 (1920) 170–171.
[27] R. Parikh, Vague predicates and language games, Theoria (Spain) XI (27) (1996) 97–107.
[28] J.B. Paris, A note on the Dutch book method, in: Proceedings of the Second International Symposium on Imprecise Probabilities and Their Applications,
Ithaca, New York, 2001.
[29] F. Portet, E. Reiter, A. Gatt, J. Hunter, S. Sripada, Y. Freer, C. Sykes, Automatic generation of textual summaries from neonatal intensive care data,
Artiﬁcial Intelligence 173 (7–8) (2009) 789–816.
[30] D. Raffman, Demoting higher-order vagueness, in: R. Dietz, S. Moruzzi (Eds.), Cuts and Clouds: Vagueness, its Nature and its Logic, Oxford University
Press, 2010.
[31] E. Reiter, R. Dale, Building Natural Language Generation Systems, Cambridge University Press, 2006.
[32] R.M. Sainsbury, Concepts without Boundaries, in: R. Keefe, P. Smith (Eds.), Vagueness: A Reader, MIT Press, 1997.
[33] R. Sambuc, Fonctions-ﬂoues. Application a l’aide au diagnostic en pathologie thyroidienne, PhD thesis, Univ. Marseille, France, 1975.
[34] G. Shafer, A Mathematical Theory of Evidence, Princeton University Press, 1976.
[35] S. Shapiro, Vagueness in Context, Oxford University Press, 2006.
[36] N.J.J. Smith, Vagueness and Degrees of Truth, Oxford University Press, 2008.
[37] L. Steels, T. Belpaeme, Coordinating perceptually grounded categories through language, Behavioural and Brain Sciences 28 (2005) 469–529.
[38] Y. Tang, J. Lawry, Bipolar semantic cells: An interval model of linguistic labels, Lecture Notes in Computer Science 7027 (2011) 60–71.
[39] K. van Deemter, Utility and language generation: The case of vagueness, Journal of Philosophical Logic 38 (2009) 607–632.
[40] K. van Deemter, Not Exactly: In Praise of Vagueness, Oxford University Press, 2010.
[41] B.C. van Fraasen, Singular terms, truth-value gaps, and free logic, The Journal of Philosophy 63 (17) (1966) 481–495.
[42] R. Yager, Set-based representations of conjunctive and disjunctive knowledge, Information Sciences 41 (1987) 1–22.
[43] L.A. Zadeh, The concept of a linguistic variable and its application to approximate reasoning: I, Information Sciences 8 (1975) 199–249.
[44] T. Williamson, Vagueness, Routledge, 1994.
